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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE

)

)

)

Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant

Table of Contents

Affiant, Jonathan Santana of MDPD 0 00 o.oo 0 000 00000 000 0000 000 000 000 oo·oo 0 0 0 000 000 00 ooo 00000 ooo 00 000 00 00 00 000 oooooo 0000 00 0 00 000 00 0 03

Affiant, Charles Thon1as of HSI 00 0 oo••oo ooo oooo•oo 000000 0000 ooo 000 00 ooo 000 ooooo 0 00 000 00 000000 0 00 00 000 0000 00 oo.oo 000 0000 0 0 0 000 00 0000 005

Basis ofK.nowledge oooooo•ooooooooooooooooooooo•ooo•oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo•o·oooooooooooooooo•oooooooooooo8

Trade Based Money Laundering and "The Black Market Peso Exchange" oo•oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 10

Expert Testin1ony on the BMPE 000 0 00 00 00 00 000000 ooo 0000 0 00 0 00 o 00 ooo 000000 00000 000 00 ooo 0 00 000 00 00 0 00 00 0000 ooo 00 0 0000000 000 00 00 00 0 022

The Application of the Statutory Provisions Proscribing Money Laundering in Florida 000000000000023

The Enterprise o 0 0 o o 0 o. 0 0 o o 0. 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 o o o o 0 0 0 o o 0 0 o o. 0 o. 0 0 .. 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 0. o 0 o o 0 0 0 o o 0 0 0 o. 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0. 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0. 0. 0 0 0 0 0 25

Narco-Money Laundering Incident Alpha- February 19, 2014 (Chicago, Illinois) 00000000000000000000027

Narco-Money Laundering Incident Bravo- March 26, 2014 (Chicago, Illinois) oooo .............. oo .. ooo29

RICO Predicate Act Number 1 -May 22, 2014 (Chicago, Illinois)oo .. oooooo .... oo ......... oo .. oooooo .......... o31

RICO Predicate Act Number 2- June 3, 2014 (Houston, Texas) .............. oo ......... oo.oo•oooooooooooooo .... 32

RICO Predicate Act Number 3- July 9, 2014 (Newark, New Jersey) ...... oo ... oooooooo ... oo .. oo ........... oo.34

RICO Predicate Act Number 4- July 10, 2014 (New York, New York) oooooooooo ......... oooooooooooooo .... 36

Narco-Money Laundering Incident Charlie- July 25,2014 (New York, New York) 0000000 ....... 00.37

RICO Predicate Act Number 5- September 9, 2014 (Chicago, Illinois) ....... oooo ... oo .. oooo .... oo .......... 40

RICO Predicate Act Number 6- October 3, 2014 (New York, New York) oooooooooo•oooooo ................ 42

RICO Predicate Act Number 7- October 6, 2014 (Atlanta, Georgia) 000000000000 ........................... 00.43

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RICO Predicate Act Number 8- October 15, 2014 (Detroit, Michigan) .................................... .45

RICO Predicate Act Number 9- November 10, 2014 (Chicago, Illinois) .................................. .47

RICO Predicate Act Number 10- December 5, 2014 (Detroit, Michigan) .................................. 55

RICO Predicate Act Number 11- December 23, 2014 (Miami, Florida) .................................... 62

RICO Predicate Act Number 12- January 6, 2015 (Newark, New Jersey) .................................. 65

RICO Predicate Act Number 13- January 15, 2015 (Chicago, Illinois) ...................................... 68

RICO Predicate Act Number 14- January 30,2015 (Miami, Florida) ......................................... 69

RICO Predicate Act Number 15- February 5, 2015 (Newark, New Jersey) ............................... 75

Narco-Money Laundering Incident Delta- February 27, 2015 (Newark, New Jersey) .............. 80

RICO Predicate Act Number 16- April13, 2015 (Boston, Massachusetts) ................................. 86

The Aborted Kidnapping ofLIZARAZO MENDOZA- April17, 2015 (Cali, Colombia) ......... 87

Narco-Money Laundering Incident Echo- June 2, 2015 (Newark, New Jersey) ........................ 93

RICO Predicate Act Number 17- July 22, 2015 (Chicago, Illinois) ........................................... 95

RICO Predicate Act Number 18 -August 17,2015 (Chicago, Illinois) ...................................... 96

N arco-Money Laundering Incident Fox trot- August 28, 2015 (Chicago, Illinois) ...................... 98

The Debriefing of CASTRO SANTANA, December 17,2015 (Bogota, Colombia) ................. 101

N arco-Money Laundering Incident Go(f- February 25, 2016 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) .... 1 03

The Approach ofLIZARAZO MENDOZA- February 28, 2016 (Panama City, Panama) ........ 1 04

CS 1 's Identification of LIZARAZO MENDOZA ....................................................................... 1 08

A Meeting between CSl and LIZARAZO MENDOZA- March 2016 (Cali, Colombia) .......... 110

Fotiy-four Factors Indicative of Op. Neymar as Trade-Based Narco-Money Laundering ........ 111

Breakdown of Charges ................................................................................................................ 120

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~ffiant 1!umber ®ne ~~~l"

Jonathan Santana, a Detective with the Miami-Dade Police Department

("MDPD") and Task Force Officer ("TFO") with the Department of Homeland

Security ("DHS"), Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI"), being duly sworn, deposes, and

states that:

1.

I am an investigative or law enforcement officer within the meaning of Section

2510(7) ofTitle 18, United States Code, and Florida Statute§ 934.02(6), that is, an officer ofthe

United States who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of and to make arrests for

offenses enumerated in Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code and offenses enumerated in

Florida Statute§ 934.07.

2.

I have been an officer with MDPD since May 2005. I have received basic training

in narcotics, money laundering, and related investigations at the Miami-Dade Police Academy

located in Miami, Florida. I am currently assigned to Homeland Security Investigations, Group

17 since June, 2012, as a Task Force Officer.

3.

Your Affiant has been the affiant on numerous arrest warrants and has

patiicipated in numerous search warrants. Your Affiant has effected arrests and testified in comi

based upon evidence seized during the execution of those warrants and atTest affidavits. Many of

those investigations involved the trafficking of narcotics and/or money laundering.

4.

Your Affiant has received specialized training in the identification of narcotics

and dangerous dmgs and money laundering investigations by the U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement ("ICE"), the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA''), Miami-Dade Police

Department (MDPD), and the South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area ("HIDTA"),

as well as several other law enforcement agencies.

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5.

In connection with my official duties as a TFO, I am responsible for conducting

investigations into violations of Title 21 of the United States Code, governing food and drugs,

and other federal criminal statutes, as well as Florida Statutes Chapter 893 concerning drug

abuse prevention and control, Chapter 896 concerning offenses related to financial transactions,

and other Florida criminal statutes. I have received training regarding the investigation of

narcotics trafficking and money laundering. In pmiicular, I have participated in numerous

narcotics investigations, including investigating possession of controlled substances with intent

to distribute and the distribution of controlled substances, in violation of Florida State Statutes

Chapter 893. I have also pmiicipated in numerous money laundering investigations involving

Florida Statute 896. These investigations have resulted in the arrests of more than twenty targets

and the seizure of various narcotics and assets, including interdiction of bulk cash meant to be

laundered through the United States financial system.

6.

During the course of these investigations, I have debriefed defendants,

informants, and witnesses who had personal knowledge regarding narcotics trafficking

organizations. I have conducted physical surveillances, prepared affidavits, executed numerous

search warrants, analyzed evidence and information obtained from comi-authorized pen register

and trap and trace devices, telephone toll records, and reviewed and transcribed recorded calls. I

have also participated in and suppmied multiple investigations where wire intercepts were used

and been the affiant in eight (8) wiretap applications. As a result of my experience and training, I

am familiar with the methods of operation typically used in drug trafficking and money

laundering, including the manner in which various types of illegal drugs are cultivated,

manufactured, smuggled, distributed, or diverted, as well as methods used to finance drug

transactions and launder drug proceeds. I know that drug traffickers often require the use of a

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telephone facility to negotiate times, places, schemes, and manner for importing, possessing,

concealing, and distributing controlled substances, and for arranging the disposition of proceeds

from the sale of controlled substances. I know that money launderers and drug traffickers also

use cellular telephones to facilitate and coordinate money drops/pickups. I also know that money

launderers and drug traffickers use fraudulent information to subscribe to communication

facilities to thwmi law enforcement efforts to intercept their communications and to ascertain

their identity.

~ffinnt ~umber \!two ~~~2"

7 (Charles Thomas, a special agent with HSI being duly sworn, deposes, and state

~that:

7.

I am an investigative or law enforcement officer within the meaning of Section

2510(7) of Title 18, United States Code, and Florida Statute§ 934.02(6), that is, an officer ofthe

United States who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of and to make anests for

offenses enumerated in Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code and offenses enumerated in

Florida Statute § 934.07.

8.

I have been a law enforcement officer for nearly twenty years. Prior to becoming

a law enforcement officer, your co-affiant received his Bachelor of A1is degree in international

relations from Florida International University and worked in various capacities in the private

sector. In 1998, your co-affiant accepted employment with the U.S. Customs Service, in their

Miami office, as a customs inspector. Pursuant to this employment, your co-affiant completed a

four month academy class at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ("FLETC" from

hereafter) in Brunswick, Georgia. During my time at FLETC, I engaged in the study of U.S.

customs law, including processing international passengers, collecting international duties, and

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the application of tariffs in the processing of international cargo. In addition, your co-affiant

studied Fourth and Fifth Amendment principles, with a focus on border search authority, and the

use of firearms and self-defense.

9.

From July 1998 until May of 2004, your co-affiant was employed by the U.S.

Customs Service in a variety of positions, spending the majority of my time working

international narcotics smuggling at both the Miami International Airport and the Port of Miami.

My work resulted in countless arrests for violations of federal narcotics law. In the year 2001

alone, your co-affiant was responsible for fifty-six narcotics related arrests. As a result, that year

I was named by the U.S. Customs Service as Miami's Office of Field Operations outstanding

narcotics agent.

10. In addition to the arrests I have made, during my six years of service with the U.S.

Customs Service, your co-affiant's work resulted in the seizure of over one-hundred (1 00)

kilograms of illicit narcotics and large amounts of currency being smuggled both into and out of

the United States. Due to my expertise, I was eventually made senior custom inspector, training

other inspectors in how to conduct narcotics interdictions. In this capacity, the United States

government flew me to New York and Los Angeles to conduct trainings, in addition to the

trainings I conducted in Miami. Before leaving the U.S. Customs Service in 2004, your co-

affiant had received numerous awards in recognition of my work.

11. In May of 2004, your co-affiant transferred from the U.S. Customs Service to

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's ("ICE" from hereafter) investigative arm, as a special

agent. Subsequently, ICE's investigative groups became what is now known as Homeland

Security Investigations. Once again, your co-affiant was sent to FLETC for additional training

before becoming a special agent. This training included an eleven week course on basic criminal

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investigations, and an additional eleven week academy specific to immigration and customs

enforcement. Upon completion of the aforementioned, your co-affiant began work in the Miami

Field OHice as a special agent assigned to a narcotics interdiction group, eventually working up

to complex criminal conspiracies utilizing employees imbedded within the infrastructure of U.S.

ports of entry to illegally transport various contraband.

12. In the summer of 2007, your co-affiant was sent back to FLETC to attend

undercover operations school and subsequently joined HSI Miami's Financial Division. For the

past eight years your co-affiant has been responsible for investigating trade-based money

laundering, with a focus on the Black Market Peso Exchange ("BMPE" from hereafter). During

this time, I have developed an extensive base of knowledge regarding how international narcotics

trafficking organizations employ the BMPE to receive the profits of their illegal drug sales

throughout the world and how those organizations employ international import and expmi

businesses to facilitate this activity. My familiarity with trade-based money laundering is multi-

faceted:

First, I have been trained by some of the most experienced money laundering

experts in the country regarding the methods and means of laundering profits generated by

means of criminal enterprise. I have benefited exponentially from the work of those who came

before me in discerning the patterns of activity in question and understanding the subtle

indicators of an individual, business, or organizations' involvement in money laundering.

Second, I have logged hundreds of hours listening to and reading the contents of

the communications of money launderers intercepted by law enforcement during the execution of

proactive investigations. Studying these communications has provided a wealth of knowledge

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that would normally be reserved for members and conspirators in the organizations conducting

these schemes, opening up their clandestine operations in a way understood by very few.

Third, I have debriefed and/or been the controlling agent for numerous

confidential sources surreptitiously working on behalf of law enforcement while appearing to be

acting on behalf of the groups being investigated. My experience in these debriefs has both

coiToborated my existing knowledge and augmented my understanding of trade-based money

laundering.

Fourth, as a case-agent, and while assisting other agents in their own

investigations, I have directed the handling of dozens of undercover operations in which money

has been laundered on behalf of criminal enterprises. Doing so has allowed me to observe the

manner in which the subject transactions take place from the initiation through complete

exoneration of the debts in question.

13. Your co-affiant's investigations into trade-based money laundering has resulted in

significant atTests and the seizure of millions of dollars of monies subsequently forfeited to the

government. In addition, your co-affiant has extensive experience testifying in both state and

federal comis in various hearings and in front of the grand jury. I've participated in the

execution of numerous search warrants, and I am experienced in the use of pre registers, trap-

and-trace devices, mobile tracking devices, and wiretaps as a means of conducting electronic

surveillance.

7Jja%i% of JRno\.ulebge

14. This affidavit is based upon personal knowledge derived from participation in this

investigation and upon information believed to be reliable from the following sources:

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a.

oral reports, written repmis, and other documentation about this investigation

received from HSI agents at SAC/Miami, other HSI SAC offices, and the Drug

Enforcement Administration;

b.

Al and A2's discussions concerning this investigation with experienced money

laundering investigators;

c.

physical surveillances and investigations conducted by HSI SAC/Miami, other

HSI offices, the Miami Dade Police Department, and various other local police

departments throughout the county;

d.

public records in both the United States and Colombia;

e.

telephone toll records, pen register and trap and trace infmmation, and telephone

subscriber information for BBMl, BBM2, and numerous other electronic devices

used to facilitate the criminal activity under investigation;

f.

interviews with business owners in the United States and Colombia that use the

BMPE to receive or transfer payment for goods and services being exchanged

between the two countries;

g.

interviews with BMPE money couriers, Smurfs, and brokers working in both the

United States and Colombia; and

h.

eight wire and electronic interceptions conducted on the BBM PINs of Colombian

money brokers associated with this investigation.

15. Since this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing an arrest

warrant A 1 and A2 have not included each and eve1y fact known to them concerning this

investigation. Al and A2 have set forth only those facts that they believe are essential to

establish the necessary foundation for the requested warrant.

Page 9 ofl26

m:ralle jlja%ell ;!flllonep JLannllertnu anll "m:ue jljlach ;iflllarltet f)e%o

Qfxcl)anue"

16. The BMPE is a type of trade-based money laundering characterized by a complex

senes of international trade transactions in which money brokers, a/k/a, "intennediaros de

pesos," manipulate foreign currency markets to route drug proceeds through the U.S. financial

system. It is estimated that as much as $5 billion is laundered annually through the BMPE.

BMPE-type schemes exist in numerous countries in Latin and South America, including

Argentina, Aruba, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela, but Colombia is home to

the largest and most sophisticated BMPE in the world.

17. The BMPE is designed to benefit all involved patiies. Colombian drug traffickers

seek to be paid for expmied narcotics in untraceable Colombian pesos without attracting the

attention of law enforcement. However the proceeds of the narcotics sales will be in the form of

small U.S. bills located within the United States and the physical movement of large sums of

small bills is easily susceptible to law enforcement interdiction effmis. Additionally, even if

bulk currency is successfully smuggled into Colombia, the Colombian trafficker requires funds

in the form of Colombian pesos to continue organizational operation.

18. Colombian impmiers of U.S.-made goods seek to settle existing or prospective

debts to U.S.-based expmiers. By settling these debts through the BMPE, the Colombian

importer enjoys a discounted exchange rate, free of taxes and regulation by the state-run central

bank. The products purchased from the U.S.-based exporters are then smuggled into Colombia,

often through Panama, Aruba, and Venezuela, in avoidance of taxes. However much of the

merchandise is moved directly into Colombian ports where bribed officials allow the goods to

bypass customs.

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19.

Money brokers are the conduits through which the BMPE system works. These

brokers purchase large amounts of narcotics proceeds in the form ofU.S. cunency located within

the United States. The broker's agents (couriers) clandestinely deposit these U.S. dollars into

bank accounts so the funds may be easily manipulated. The broker sells the U.S. dollars to the

Colombian impmiers. In exchange, the broker receives Colombian pesos in Colombia. Thus the

Colombian importer can settle the U.S.-based debt with U.S. currency and the broker can pay the

Colombian drug trafficker in Colombian pesos.

20. The U.S.-based businesses in question quickly become addicted to the cheap,

readily available cash, because to remain viable with their Latin American business pminers they

must respond to the market's requirements. Due to inflated official exchange rates, money

transferring (wire-transferring) fees, and significant impmi taxes in many Latin American

countries, a thriving black market of otherwise licit products and services dominates many of

their economies. In order for the U.S.-based businesses to be competitive in these various

marketplaces, they must accept bulk narcotics proceeds or run the very real risk of losing

business to those who will or to competitors from other countries.

21. Mexican drug cartels pmiicipate by purchasing the narcotics on credit from

Colombian drug traffickers, distributing the narcotics to U.S. cities, collecting the proceeds of

the narcotics sales, and delivering a pmiion of the proceeds to the money broker's couriers, to

extinguish their debt to the Colombian cmiel. The Mexican cartels are also known to employ

Colombian money brokers to repatriate their profits from the product sold on the streets in the

United States.

22. Money couriers working for the Mexican Cartels do not have a direct relationship

with the Colombian Cartels or the money broker's organization. When a Colombian drug

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trafficker is to receive payment for already-exported narcotics from his/her Mexican counterpmi,

the Colombian trafficker will hire a Colombia-based money broker. The money broker will

provide the Colombian trafficker with the contact information for a money courier located in the

United States. The Colombian trafficker will then pass that contact information along to a

representative of the Mexican drug cmiel with instructions to deliver currency to the broker's

courier. The Mexican cartel's representative will then instruct his courier, also located in the

United States, to follow the instructions.

23.

Therefore the parties who will physically transfer the U.S. dollars consist of a

Mexican cartel's courier and a Colombian money broker's courier. Neither courier will have

ever met the other, may have limited knowledge of their own superiors, and will have no relevant

information regarding their counterpmi's organization.

24.

This is because the organizations seek to achieve the maxmmm amount of

anonymity feasible by employing a byzantine network of couriers, representatives, and agents.

The structures of the contracting organizations involve layers of subordinates that insulate the

highest levels from the more easily identified lower ranking members. Thus, only high ranking

members of the Colombian cartels would know the identity of the money broker being employed

to effectuate the transaction, while no one on the Mexican side of the transaction would have any

knowledge of this person's identity.

\!rue \ltppiral QColombian 7Jij1l!l~Qf W:ransartion Jht\.lolbint{

Jlrttt{ Jlebts ~well to a QColombian Jlrttt{ QCartel

25.

A typical Colombian BMPE transaction involving drug debts owed to a

Colombian drug cmiel occurs as follows:

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First, a Colombian drug trafficker sells narcotics on credit to a Mexican cartel that

maintains a smuggling and distribution network. It is understood that payment from the

Mexicans will be in the form of U.S. currency, to be exchanged between the parties in the

United States upon the subsequent sale of the narcotics. The drugs are then sold by the

Mexican cartel to intermediaries and drug dealers in various U.S. cities. The cash

proceeds from these sales are collected in numerous stash houses to ultimately be

laundered into the U.S. financial system.

Second, after the Mexicans have distributed the narcotics and collected the profits,

they will notify the Colombians. In response, a representative of the Colombian drug

trafficker approaches a money broker, known as a "primer a mano" (first hand) and

solicits the sale of United States currency located within the United States in exchange

for a percentage, generally five to fifteen percent of the total contract, which will

typically be for no less than $50,000.00 and no more than $1,000,000.00.

Third, the primera mano Colombian money broker will offer the contract to one

or several sub-brokers, who will bid on the contract based on the current official

exchange rates. The contract will then be sold to the sub-broker offering to purchase the

currency at the highest exchange rate. In this way, the primera mano broker will again

profit from the transaction, because he is selling the currency at an advantageous

exchange rate.

Fourth, the sub-broker reviews his book of business to determine which

Colombian business are in need of U.S. currency to purchase goods or services to be

Page 13 of 126

exported from the U.S. to Colombia. Thereafter, a Colombia-based business owner and

the sub-broker will negotiate an exchange rate for the purchase of the U.S. currency

which is greater than that for which the sub-broker purchased the currency from the

primera mano broker. The sub-broker's only profit is the difference between these two

exchange rates.

Fifth, the Colombian business in need of the U.S. currency will contact the U.S.-

based business they are purchasing products or services from to let them know that the

transaction can be f1nalized and that payment will be forthcoming from an unspecified

third-patty.

Sixth, the sub-broker reaches out to his network of U.S.-based "pick-up crews,"

consisting of money couriers and other individuals with access to accounts at various

global financial institutions. The sub-broker and representative from the pick-up crew

negotiate a fee for the contract in the form of a percentage of the total currency to be

collected. The fee generally ranges from 2% - 10% depending on the risk associated with

the amount and location of the currency. Once the contract is accepted by the pick-up

crew, their representative provides the sub-broker with the phone number of the courier

they will be using to pick up the cunency.

Seventh, after contracting with an appropriate pick-up crew, the sub-broker passes

along the pick-up crew's courier's contact information to the primera mano broker, who,

in turn, contacts the Colombian drug trafficker's representative. The primera mano

broker provides the cartel representative with the information and requests a phone

Page 14 of 126

number and passphrase or serial number for the Mexican cartel's money courier in the

U.S. This courier will physically transfer the currency to the sub-broker's pick-up crew.

Eight, the sub-broker provides the U.S based pick-up crew with the phone number

of the Mexican cmiel's courier and a passphrase or serial number. The pick-up crew

waits for a phone call from the Mexican cartel's courier. The phone call generally

consists of a terse conversation consisting of little more than a verification of a dollar

amount, the exchange of the passphrase or serial number, and an agreement regarding

when and where to meet for the physical exchange of the currency.

Ninth, the pick-up crew receives the currency from the Mexican cmiel's money

courier. The physical exchange will generally take place in a public location, typically a

parking lot. During the transaction the parties will not engage in conversation, the money

will not be counted, and there is no receipt for the currency to document the exchange.

The money will be packaged in quick-count bundles held together with rubber bands and

be housed in an unusual manner, such as a duffle-bag, shoebox, pillowcase, etc. Once

this physical exchange has taken place, the debt owed by the Mexican Cartel to the

Colombian Catiel is exonerated and the debt to the Colombian cartel is now owed by the

money brokers.

Tenth, the pick-up crew suneptitiously moves the currency into the U.S. financial

system through funnel accounts that are used to temporarily hold the money until it can

be provided to the U.S.-based business that the Colombian business is purchasing goods

or services from. The accounts in question are opened and maintained by individuals

known as "Smurfs," who are sent from Colombia to the United States to deposit bulk

Page 15 of 126

illicit cunency into numerous accounts in repetitious relatively small deposits designed to

avoid generating scrutiny from law enforcement.

Eleventh, the sub-broker sends instructions to the pick-up crew regarding where

the currency in the Smurfs fmmel account is ultimately to be deposited, dropped-off, or,

wired. The cunency is then moved into the specified accounts, which are usually

domiciled either in the U.S. or the Far East, in accounts controlled by the U.S.-based

expmier in question.

Twelfth, upon completion of the currency transfer, the sub-broker sends

confirmation of the receipt of currency to the U.S.-based business, which will signify to

that business owner that the goods or services desired by the Colombian based business

may be rendered, released, or shipped to Colombia. This settles the debt between the two

otherwise legitimate businesses.

Thirteenth, immediately thereafter, the Colombian-based business will release

Colombian pesos in the agreed upon amount to the sub-broker, who provides the pesos to

the primera mano broker, to be paid out to the Colombian drug trafficker. This final

transaction exonerates the debt owned by the money brokers to the Colombian drug

trafficker who has now received the profits from the initial sale of narcotics to the

Mexican cmiel on credit.

Page 16 of 126

\!rue \!rppiral QColomhian 1i:iRflllQf \!transaction 3htboluinu

lJBruu tlrofits to he 31\emunerateb to a ;iRflexican lJBruu QCartel

26. The above described transaction explained how Colombian cmiels are paid by

Mexican cmiels once the narcotics they have exchanged have been sold on the streets of the

United States. The remainder of the money generated by those sales remains in the stash house

as the Mexican cmiel' s profits. Although the Mexican drug cartels have several ways of moving

drug money from the United States to Mexico, including physically smuggling it across the

Mexican-:American border and their own trade-based money laundering with Mexican businesses

and money brokers, they also employ the Colombian BMPE to launder their money. A typical

Colombian BMPE transaction involving drug profits to be remunerated to a Mexican drug cartel

occurs as in the same fashion described above with the following differences:

First, the Colombian primera mano broker in question will be dealing directly

with a representative of the Mexican cartel and the transaction in question will have no

c01mection to any Colombian narco-traffickers.

Second, once the Colombian money broker has received pesos in Colombia from

the Colombian-based businessperson he will need to pay out the debt in Mexico, instead

of Colombia. This is done via a system known as "contra-entrega," (minor transaction),

which is a form of hawala. Hawala is a system of exchanging money that has been used

in the Middle East and South Asia for hundreds of years, but is currently employed

worldwide to exchange money outside of legitimate financial institutions. Hawala

involves money brokers with long-standing relationships and strong financial ties to a

particular locality. When a hawaladar is asked to transfer money from one location to

Page 17 of 126

another by a client, he will contact a hawaladar in the location where the client wants the

money moved to. The first hawaladar asks the second to pay out a certain amount of

money in that location to a money courier and provides a phone number and pass-phrase

to verify the courier's identity. The second hawaladar then contacts the courier and

arranges for the exchange. Both hawaladars profit by charging a fee for their services,

however, the second hawaladar still needs to be made whole for the res of the transaction.

This is accomplished over time as the two hawaladars continue to do business together

their debts will eventually even out because the transactions in question will move in both

directions.

Third, the Colombian money broker will call his business associate in Mexico,

acting as a hawaladar, with the phone number and pass-phrase of the Mexican cmiel's

representative in Mexico. The cmiel's representative and the hawaladar's representative

will then agree on an exchange location and a physical exchange of currency will take

place, exhausting the Colombian money broker's debt to the Mexican cartel, who have

now received the profits of their American narcotics sales in the form of pesos within the

confines ofMexico.

27.

Tlu·ough this system the following has been accomplished:

a. The drug trafficker has recovered his illicit profits, which were effectively

trapped in the U.S., in his preferred form of payment (pesos);

b. The Colombian business owner has purchased U.S. goods or services at a

discounted rate, completely tax free;

c. The money broker earned a profit by buying pesos low and selling them high;

Page 18 of 126

d. The pick-up crew receives a percentage of the currency collected;

e. The Mexican cartel and its couriers are relieved of the debt owed the

Colombian drug expmier for the initial purchase of narcotics.

28. BMPE transactions are designed and conducted in a fashion intended to obscure

the direct relationship between the money being moved and the trafficking in illegal narcotics. It

is the facts surrounding these transactions establish that the currency moved is the proceeds of

illicit activity. Such facts generally include:

a. The individuals involved in these transactions have never met previously and

never meet again. They are provided with a prearranged code in the form of

cryptic passphrases and/or random serial numbers that allow both parties to

verify that they were representing the specific trafficker and a specific money

broker's interest in the transaction;

b. When the trafficker's counterpmi and the money broker's counterpart make

telephonic contact, they exchange an assigned code, passphrase, or serial

number for the money pick-up, decide on a location and time to meet, and

exchange vehicle, clothing, or physical descriptions. This is done without any

conversation regarding the interests they are representing, their identities, the

subject ofthe meeting, etc.;

c. The currency is transferred between the individuals without being counted and

without an offer of a receipt or a request for a receipt;

Page 19 of 126

d. The currency exchanged is often significantly more or significantly less than

the amount agreed upon by the patties, showing a necessary elasticity in the

relationships between the patties that would not be acceptable in a legitimate

business relationship;

e. The currency is transferred in a container designed to disguise the existence of

the currency. Examples include computer boxes or gaming system boxes,

shoe boxes, shopping bags, duffle bags, pillow cases, etc.;

f. The currency is separated and packaged into "quick count bundles," held

together by rubber bands, as opposed to being packaged in bank bands marked

with denominations;

g. The cmTency is well-worn cash that shows significant use in casual

transactions, consistent with street-level narcotics sales and an enterprise that

avoids use of the banking system;

h. The currency is not exchanged at a place of business. Instead, the meetings

take place in a neutral, public location where legitimate business on this scale

would never be conducted, but the risk of a robbery is ameliorated by the

presence of the general public. As a rule of thumb, parking lots in major

business centers are used for the physical exchange of currency;

1.

The individuals involved in these transactions are acutely cognizant of their

surroundings and the actions of vehicles and individuals in the area where

they are to pick up or deliver cash. It is common for these individuals to drive

Page 20 of 126

around the area where a transaction is to take place and search for the

presence of police or the presence of individuals whom they may perceive to

be a tlu·eat to commit robbery. It is also common for the individuals delivering

the cunency to have other individuals conducting counter-surveillance, to

prevent robbery and/or to identify police activity;

J. In transit to and from these illicit financial transactions, it is common for the

couriers to continuously monitor their vehicle mirrors for surveillance, make

abrupt U-turns, drive down one way streets, stop in the middle of a roadway

while observing passing vehicles, drive at an excessive rate of speed, make

abrupt lane changes, and pull into numerous parking lots without ever exiting

their vehicle (a practice known as "cleaning

1

" themselves). As a whole, these

driving maneuvers, designed to detect surveillance, are commonly referred to

by law enforcement as "heat runs." This behavior is indicative of the

individual's knowledge of the illicit nature of the transaction and the illegal

origin of the currency they are transporting/distributing;

k. In cases where stash-houses used by money couriers have been identified and

subsequently approached by law enforcement, consent searches and the

execution of search warrants often reveal additional bulk cash and large

amounts of narcotics commingled in with the currency.

1 "Cleaning," may be accomplished in various fashions, but is generally employed by criminals as a form of counter-

surveillance or to limit law enforcement's ability to effectively conduct surveillance.

Page 21 of 126

<!expert ~e~timonp on tue 7b1j}ltl~<le

29. Throughout the course of this investigation, both Al and A2 have engaged in

extensive research, by way of interviews and conversations with subject matter experts in trade

based money laundering and the Black Market Peso Exchange. Amongst those consulted were

state and federal law enforcement officers with decades of experience investigating hundreds of

BMPE cells with ties to various Latin American countries. Those individuals uniformly agreed

that the BMPE is fueled by cunency generated as a result of trans-national narcotics trafficking.

They also collectively agreed that narcotics are the overwhelmingly dominant form of illicit

exports from Latin American countries operating black market currency exchanges. While other

forms of trade based money laundering exist and may be employed with other criminal schemes,

none of the investigators surveyed could cite a single example of a BMPE case that employed

cunency derived from an alternative form of illegal activity.

30.

There are disparate reasons for this. For example, John Tobon, Deputy Special

Agent in Charge of the Miami Field Division of Homeland Security Investigations, noted that

although Latin American criminals engage in human trafficking and human smuggling, unlike

narcotics trafficking, which is a credit based enterprise, human trafficking and human smuggling

operations tend to be pay-as-you-go, meaning every time the person being trafficked or

smuggled changes hands, an accounting is rendered and payment is made; thus, there is no need

to launder any proceeds back to the home country via the BMPE. Investigator Tommy Moran of

the South Florida Money Laundering Strike Force, a former Detective with the Miami Beach

Police Depmiment with over fmty years of experience investigating organized crime, noted that

he gained an intimate familiarity with how gambling proceeds are paid out and debts are

collected by pmticipating in dozens of wiretap investigations. According to Investigator Moran,

Page 22 of 126

gambling collections and payouts are not conducted in the anonymous fashion that is integral to

the BMPE, but rather are handled by trusted associates who have developed relationships over

long periods of time. Also, historically, bookmaking, loansharking, the numbers racket, bolita,

illegal lottery schemes, and other forms of illegal gambling payouts and collections are not

conducted in the form of the vast quantities of bulk currency which characterize the BMPE, but

rather in significantly more modest transactions. Moreover, payouts of gambling proceeds and

collections of gambling debts are meticulously counted for accuracy and the types of fluctuations

above or below the agreed upon exchange, which are both expected and accepted in the BMPE,

are not seen in gambling operations.

31. Other forms of organized crime can be eliminated as possible sources of currency

for simpler reasons: In the case of cargo theft, which is also prevalent among Latin American

criminal enterprises, the proceeds of the activity flow in the opposite direction of the BMPE,

with criminal organizations overseas paying syndicates in the United States for their stolen

products. In the various lucrative forms of insurance fraud, public assistance fraud, and tax

fraud, being effectuated by criminals with ties to Latin American countries, the proceeds of the

criminal activities are not generated in the form of cash, but rather as drafts or checks, thus, the

BMPE is not useful to those engaged in large scale fraud.

\!rue ~pplication of tue ~tatutorp l)roui%ion% l)ro%crillin~ ;iffilonep

1Launberin~ in jfloriba

32. Florida Statute §896.1 01, also known as the "Florida Money Laundering Act,"

governs financial transactions that constitute criminal offenses against the State. Although this

single statute requires the use of nearly 2,500 words to define its application, its operative

language is as follows:

Page 23 of 126

(3) It is unlawful for a person:

(a) Knowing that the propetiy involved in a financial transaction represents the

proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such

a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity:

1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or

2. Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in pati:

a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or

the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

b. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement or money transmitters'

registration requirement under state law.

(b) To transpoti or attempt to transpoti a monetary instrument or funds:

1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or

2. Knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transpmiation

represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such

transpmiation is designed in whole or in part:

a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or

the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

b. To avoid a transaction repotiing requirement or money transmitters'

registration requirement under state law.

33.

Coalesced into something intelligible to the lay person, §896.101 makes engaging

in any of the following four acts a felony:

~ Exchanging illegally generated currency

2

with any individual or institution for the

purpose continuing or benefiting illegal activitl;

~ Exchanging illegally generated currency with any individual or institution to obscure

it's illegal nature;

~ Transporting any cmTency, whether illegally or legitimately generated, for the

purpose of continuing or benefiting illegal activity;

2 The source of the illegally generated currency, as applied to each subsection of the statute, must be from an

enumerated specified unlawful activity, however, the participants to the laundering need only believe that the

cun·ency was generated by any act, specified or not, that would constitute a felony under state or federal law.

Florida Statute 896.101 (2)(a).

3 The illegal activity being promoted under each subsection of 896.101 must be one of the enumerated specified

unlawful activities listed in subsection (2)(g).

Page 24 of 126

);> Transporting illegally generated currency to obscure its illegal nature

34.

Accordingly, the cunency drops used to facilitate the BMPE are, in and of

themselves, completed money laundering transactions regardless of whether any other facet of

the scheme is ever effectuated.

\!roe Qf:nterpri%e

35.

Operation Neymar focused on the actions of a large group of Colombian money

launderers based in Cali, Colombia, working together on a daily basis, providing the human

capital necessary to keep up with the large volume of money laundering contracts available to

them from drug cmiels in entrenched in Mexico and Colombia, capitalizing on the surfeit drug

markets of the western world. The two main targets of the investigation were Ivan Andres

LIZARAZO MENDOZA, alk/a "NEYMAR," "CR7," "ROBBEN," "BALE," "JACOBO," and

"ALI" and Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, a/kla "PEDRITO," "MANUEL," "ANTONIO,"

and "GUERO," whom, along with other associates identified and unidentified, will be

collectively referred to as "the Enterprise."

36. As stated, the Enterprise consisted of trans-national money launderers working on

contract with Latin American narco-traffickers. Although subject to changes in leadership and

hierarchy due to disruption by law enforcement and extra-judicial sanctioning in the form of

various acts of intimidation and violence, the Enterprise continued to exist throughout the period

specified in this information and at all times consisted of Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA, Ivan

Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, and numerous "John DOEs" operating under aliases designed to

protect their identity from each other and from law enforcement. The purpose of the Enterprise

was to generate monetary profits, which were earned by laundering narco-dollars on behalf of

Page 25 of 126

Mexican and Colombian drug cmiels through the U.S. financial system and facilitated by

international trade between the United States and Latin America. The Enterprise intentionally

operated in a compmimentalized fashion in order to exploit specialization of labor and to shield

the very fact of its existence, which ensured the relative security of the individual members from

each other and from law enforcement.

3 7.

Within the Enterprise, CASTRO SANTANA acted as the point of contact with

the narco-traffickers whose currency needed to be laundered in order to make it available to them

in Latin America. LIZARAZO MENDOZA acted as a point of contact with the businesses that

were employed to move the money into the U.S. financial system and also as a point of contact

with the Enterprise's money couriers. Thus, CASTRO SANTANA would receive the initial

money laundering contracts from the Enterprise's narco-trafficker clients and LIZARAZO

MENDOZA would attend to the practical aspects of laundering the money. In addition to

CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the Enterprise consisted of individuals yet

to be fully identified, who worked full-time in the money laundering scheme as inte1mediaries,

book-keepers, couriers, and administrative assistants.

38.

The Enterprise was capable oflaundering approximately $1,000,000.00 per month

during the majority of the investigation and sometimes significantly more. In the thirteen

months between July 25, 2014, and August 24, 2015, more than $1,000,000.00 was seized ti·om

the Enterprise, along with quantities of cocaine, heroin, cannabis, a money counter, a narcotics

press, a heat-sealer used to package bulk currency, several ledgers, and myriad packaging

materials associated with drug trafficking.

39. Through the course of the investigation information received via intercepted

communications, subject interviews, and various other sources has indicated that the laundered

Page 26 of 126

drug profits in question have belonged to at least two di±Ierent organizations: (1) The United

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia Catiel, alk/a Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or "AUC,"

which is a drug trafficking organization comprised the remnants of the former AUC, which was a

Colombian right-wing paramilitary group, representing an intellectual counter-point to the F ARC

and ELN, financed in large part through patiicipating in narco-trafficking; and (2) the Sinaloa

Cartel, which is generally recognized as the most powerful drug trafficking organization in the

world, headed by Joaquin "El Chapa" Guzman, who is currently being held in Mexico, but under

indictment in the United States in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT ALPHA

AMADO ORTIZ MARTINEZ

FEBRUARY 19,2014- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$49,980.00

40.

On February 18, 2014, CS1

4

was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA, making

use of BBM1 and asked to assist with a pick-up of $50,000 in bulk currency in Chicago, Illinois.

CS 1 was instructed by HSI SAC Miami to accept the contract and pass along a UC phone

number for an HSI agent in Chicago, so that LIZARAZO MENDOZA could provide the number

to the individuals in possession of the currency. After providing LIZARAZO MENDOZA with

the UC number, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided CSl with a money courier's phone number

and passphrase, "Arrocero de parte de Pajaro," which translates to "From the Rice Grower on

behalf of the Bird."

4 CS 1 acts as a subcontractor for the Enterprise, coordinating the physical pick-up of bulk currency in the United

States and various other countries. He has noted that the Enterprise uses numerous different individuals to

coordinate currency pick-ups Worldwide. For example, CS 1 has rep01ted that the Enterprise has a specific

individual that they give preference to when handling a money laundering contract in Europe and that it is known

that this individual charges I 4 points (I 4 percent) of the currency collected for his services. CS I works for HSI and

is handled by A2.

Page 27 of 126

41.

Later that day, an HSI SAC Chicago UC spoke with the individual in possession

of the cunency. After exchanging/verifying the passphrase, the UC asked how many "tickets"

were being exchanged, in reference to the amount of currency that was to change hands. The

money courier responded that there were "fifty," meaning $50,000.00. The courier stated that he

was not available to meet until later that day and they agreed to speak again that evening.

42.

At 7:22 p.m. the parties spoke again, exchanging the passphrase, before

discussing the business at hand. The courier indicated that the money was not available at the

moment and would have to be delivered the following day, but indicated that he was close by

and would like to meet, in-person, to discuss the details, so they would not have to talk on the

phone - a clear reference to security concerns. The UC feigned unavailability for the face-to-

face meeting and the two briefly discussed the urgency their "bosses" placed on completing the

transaction. The courier stated his desire to get rid of "the problem," referring to the currency, as

soon as possible.

43.

The following day, February 19, 2014, the parties spoke again and discussed

possible meeting locations. They initially discussed meeting in a particular church parking lot,

however, the UC moved the meet location to a location more advantageous to law enforcement

by telling the courier that as he had approached the church there were "blue" stopped there,

which was an indication of the presence of law enforcement. Accordingly the two agreed to

meet in the parking lot of a nearby hospital.

44.

Shortly thereafter, the courier entered the hospital parking lot driving a white

2004 Nissan Maxima, bearing Illinois plate number S 136104, registered to an individual named

Amado ORTIZ MARTINEZ, (DOB: 10/1/73), who was subsequently identified as the money

courier in this transaction. Upon entering the parking lot, ORTIZ MARTINEZ drove to the

Page 28 of 126

UC's location and, without exiting his vehicle, passed a white bag containing $49,980.00 to the

UC and immediately departed.

45.

On February 20, 2014, the currency was removed from its secure location to be

inspected by a trained narcotics detection K -9. Upon being examined by the K -9, the dog alerted

to the positive presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

46. After receiving confirmation that the transaction had been completed,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS 1 to have the currency deposited into the following bank

account:

Standard Chartered Bank

6 Battery Road #03-01, Singapore, 049909

Account

SWIFT

5

- SCBLSG22

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT BRAVO

SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED

MARCH 26,2014- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$57,000.00

47.

On March 19,2014, CS1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA and offered

a contract for $57,000, in Chicago, Illinois. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract and a

phone number and the passphrase, "Jorge de pmie de Saul" was provided.

48.

On March 24, 2014, HSI SAC Chicago contacted the courier and the passphrase

was exchanged. A photograph of the serial number for a dollar was also exchanged to be used

by the drug trafficking organization to verify that the subsequently planned meet would be with

5

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) provides a network that enables

financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions in a secure,

standardized and reliable environment. Swift also sells software and services to financial institutions.

Page 29 of 126

the correct individual. The parties thereafter agreed to meet at the Premium Outlet Mall in

Aurora, Illinois, around 3:00 p.m. that afternoon.

49.

Shortly after 3:00 p.m., the courier atTived and met with an HSI SAC Chicago

UC. In the parking lot of the mall, the money courier attempted to verify the serial number for

the dollar bill provided earlier in the day. There was a discrepancy between the number being

used by the two patiies and the courier and UC returned to their respective vehicles and made

phone calls in an attempt to rectify the situation with their superiors. Unable to resolve the

situation for the moment, the courier departed the mall and for the next hour engaged in a series

of counter-surveillance heat runs until, eventually, he successfully broke away from the mobile

surveillance units.

50.

On March 26, 2014, contact was reestablished with the courier and the parties

agreed to meet in the parking lot of the Fox Valley Mall in Aurora, Illinois, for the exchange. At

approximately 5:00p.m., the UC met with and received the currency from the same subject he

had met with on March 24. The money was packaged in quick-count bundles and concealed

inside layers of plastic wrap being transpmied in shopping bags. After the exchange, the

currency was inspected by a trained narcotics detection K-9. Upon being examined by the K-9,

the dog alerted to the positive presence of a controlled substance on the cunency. A final count

revealed the currency to be exactly $57,000.

51.

After receiving confirmation that the transaction had been completed,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS 1 to have the currency deposited into the following bank

account:

Standard Chatiered Bank

6 Battery Road #03-01, Singapore, 049909

Account

SWIFT - SCBLSG22

Page 30 of 126

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 1

PEDRO CARRASCO

MAY 22,2014- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$79,665.00

52. On May 22, 2014, CS 1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA making use of

BBM1 with PIN 2B9515D6 and asked to set up a bulk cash pick-up of $100,000 of suspected

narcotics proceeds in Chicago, Illinois. The security code phrase for this transaction was "Luis

de parte de Elkin," and the currency was referred to as "tickets," and later on as "that item." A

subpoena was generated for the phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena

showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Osbaldo Macias," and a listed address

associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

53. Subsequently on May 22, 2014, a HSI SAC Chicago undercover agent met with

an unidentified Latin male in the parking lot of a shopping mall and picked up $79,665.00. The

Latin male was driving a grey 2000 Nissan pick-up truck bearing Illinois license plate 1274807.

This vehicle is registered to Pedro CARRASCO (DOB: 1/28/1962) of 108 South Marilyn,

Northlake, Illinois. The transaction was completed by having the UC reach into the passenger's

side window of the target's vehicle where he retrieved a green bag containing the cunency. The

target's vehicle was then followed back to CARRASCO's residence. Surveillance photos were

then reviewed and CARRASCO was positively identified as the money courier.

54. After receiving confirmation of the pick-up, CS 1 was instructed by LIZARAZO

MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited

Hong Kong

Account

SWIFT - HSBCHKHHHKH

Page 31 of 126

55. The bank account in question is an off-shore fmmel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 2

LUIS A VILAR HINESTROZA GONZALEZ

JUNE 3, 2014- HOUSTON, TEXAS

$163,000.00

56.

On June 3, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 using BBM1 to

coordinate a bulk cash pick-up of suspected narcotics proceeds in Houston, Texas, in the amount

of $165,000.00. Two phones were used to facilitate this transaction: 832-212-0340, subscribed

to via T-Mobile and 713-965-4006, subscribed to via Level 3 Communications. Subpoenas were

generated for the subscriber information for each of these phone numbers. A return on the

subpoena for 832-212-0340 showed a subscriber with the name Emilo Aristi with a DOB of

07/28/1976, but no address, SSN, or financial information. A records search did not review the

existence of any person with this name and date of bitih, however, there appears to be an

individual with the name Aristi Emilo with a DOB of 07/28/1976, but this person lives in

Middlebury, Vermont, and has a phone number with a Vermont area code. A return on the

subpoena for 713-965-4006 showed no subscriber information and appears to be a pre-paid

phone.

57. When the UC made contact with the courier, a passphrase, "Con Jose de pmie de

Mateo" was exchanged and the two pmiies agreed to meet later that day at a Home Depot in

South Houston. The UC asked how much money was to be exchanged by asking, "How many

gallons," the courier had, to which the courier stated that he would tell him later. In a subsequent

conversation the UC told the courier, "I was instructed to pick-up 165 cans of paint," to which

Page 32 of 126

the courier, reassured him not to worry. When asked what vehicle the courier would be driving,

the courier was hesitant to give a response, but ultimately stated that he was driving a grey

Honda; however, this turned out to be a ruse, as the courier was identified as actually driving a

gold Lincoln.

58. The same day a SAC Houston undercover agent met with a black/Latin male in

the parking lot of an H-E-B grocery store and received $163,000.00. The money in question was

exchanged without discussion by being shoved into the pmiially open window of the UC's

vehicle. The currency was contained within a black plastic garbage bag.

59. Immediately prior to the transaction, an individual identified as Luis Avilar

HINESTROZA GONZALEZ (DOB: 3/25/58) was observed conducting counter-surveillance by

HSI personnel. HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was driving a black Nissan registered in his own

name; driving slowly back-and-forth in the area and looking into vehicles, observing their

occupants. At the moment of the exchange HINESTROZA GONZALEZ had parked his vehicle

a few feet away from an HSI surveillance vehicle. As the transaction was taking place,

HINESTROZA GONZALEZ exited his vehicle to observe the exchange. Immediately after the

bag was stuffed through the UC's vehicle's window, HISESTROZA GONZALEZ was seen

talking on the phone and exclaiming, "They have it, they have it!" Thereafter, HINESTROZA

GONZALEZ sped off in the direction of the courier's fleeing vehicle. The courier's vehicle was

being followed by HSI personnel and was driving in a pattern consistent with counter-

surveillance until it arrived at the Little Nell Apartments at 8565 W. Sam Houston Parkway. The

courier then entered apartment # 204. While conducting surveillance on the apmiment, the black

Nissan driven by HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was observed aniving in the parking lot.

HINESTROZA GONZALEZ commenced to exit his vehicle and enter apartment # 204.

Page 33 of 126

60.

After reporting that the transaction had been completed, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

instructed CS 1 to have the cash deposited in the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited

Hong Kong

Account

SWIFT- HSBCHKHHHKH

61.

The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

62.

In November of 2015, HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was interviewed by special

agents from HSI in Houston, at the apmiment he had been seen returning to immediately after

the transaction on June 3, 2014. Although he admitted owning the black Nissan in question and

stated that he is the sole driver of the vehicle, he denied involvement in bulk cash money

laundering. After the interview, agents replayed the phone calls made on the date of the

transaction and positively identified HINESTROZA GONZALEZ as the individual who made

the phone calls orchestrating the currency drop.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 3

DIEGO PERDOMO

JULY 9, 2014- NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

$55,000.00

63.

On July 9, 2014, using BBMl, with new PIN 2B980EC5, LIZARAZO

MENDOZA contacted CS 1 and asked if CS 1 could arrange the pickup of $52,000.00 in Newark,

New Jersey. A subpoena was generated for the subscriber information associated with the

courier's phone. A return on the subpoena showed that no subscriber information was available

and this was a pre-paid phone. Subsequently contact was made with the courier using the

passplu·ase "Tomas de parte de Oscar."

Page 34 of 126

64.

Later that day, a SAC Newark undercover agent met with a Latin male who was

immediately recognized as Diego PERDOMO (DOB 711611975). PERDOMO is known to HSI

agents in New Jersey to operate as a money courier on behalf of an individual named Diego

GUZMAN NUNEZ (DOB 9/9/1984) and has been observed on multiple occasions in the past

conducting bulk currency transactions in Northern New Jersey. GUZMAN NUNEZ was

deported from the United States in 2015, but before being deported was interviewed by HSI

agents. During his interview, GUZMAN NUNEZ stated that PERDOMO, as well as other

individuals, worked for him delivering U.S. currency and that the currency was derived from

cocaine sales being conducted by third parties. The investigation into GUZMAN NUNEZ's

organization also showed that he employed a Colombian national named Emis Y ohana

ESPITIA-HERNANDEZ to Smurfmoney into banks in the New York/New Jersey area.

65.

At approximately 4:30 p.m. PERDOMO entered the parking lot of a Bank of

America located on Morris Avenue in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Thereafter, PERDOMO made

contact with the UC and handed him a plastic shopping bag containing $55,000.00 in narcotic

proceeds packaged in quick count bundles. LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS 1 have

the cash laundered through the following account:

Teknopark

8750 Doral Boulevard

Doral, Florida, 33178

Account

ABA6 CITIUS33

6

The American Bankers Association (ABA) is a Washington, D.C.-based trade association for the U.S.

banking industry. They are responsible for maintenance of best practices and industry standards for routing numbers

of member bank accounts.

Page 35 of 126

66.

This paragraph intentionally left blank ...

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 4

SUBJECT UNIDENTIFfED

JULY 10, 2014-NEWYORK, NEW YORK

$40,020.00

67.

Also on July 9, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CSl via BBMl and

provided information regarding a money pick up in New York, New York. LIZARAZO

MENDOZA asked CSl to arrange the pick-up of $60,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds. A

subpoena was generated for the phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena

showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Movie Maker," and a listed address

associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

68. The following day, July 10,2014, AI made contact with the money courier using

the passphrase "Luis de parte de Roberto" and the two agreed to meet at the Starbucks at the

intersection of 93rd Street and Broadway on the Upper West Side. Later that day an unidentified

Latin male entered the Starbucks, made contact with A 1 and handed him a white plastic bag

containing U.S. currency in quick-count bundles. The Latin male stated that the bag contained

approximately $50,000.00. A subsequent count of the currency revealed it to be $40,020.00.

69. Upon exiting the Starbucks the subject was followed and observed driving a 2004

Porsche Cayenne. Surveillance units eventually lost contact with the subject vehicle due to the

subject's employment of counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

Page 36 of 126

70.

After the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA directed the money

be funneled into the following accounts:

Teknopark,

8750 Doral Boulevard

Doral, Florida, 33178

Account

ABA CITIUS33

$26,180.00

Aiweili Imp01i and Export Limited

1 Queen's Road Central

Hong Kong

Account

SWIFT- HSBCHKHHHKH

$7,020.00

Dis Cells Corporation

7474 Collins Avenue

Miami Beach, Florida, 3 3141

Account

ABA 026009593

$6,000.00

71. HSI/SAC New York was unable to successfully identify the Latin male that

conducted the currency drop. The subject was operating a 2004 Porsche Cayenne bearing New

York Tag number: FL T 5717. Checks show the vehicle is registered to Josue Ramirez of 22 Ona

Lane Apt 1, New Winsor, New York, 12553. A1 viewed a picture of Josue Ramirez obtained via

a driving records database and determined that Josue Ramirez was not the individual that

dropped the cunency at issue.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT CHARLIE

RAUL SANTIZO COLON

JULY 25,2014-NEW YORK, NEW YORK

$104,390.00

72.

On July 25, 2014, CS1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA regarding a

$100,000.00 contract in New York, New York. The password for the transaction was to be

Page 37 of 126

"German de parte de David." HSI Miami contacted SAC New York to coordinate the

identification of the target in possession of the $100,000.00. HSIISAC New York identified

Raul SANTIZO Colon (DOB: 7/29/88) acting in a surveillance conscious manner in the area of

they believed the money courier would be leaving from in Queens, New York. Upon

approaching the target, HSI NY agents obtained consent to search his hotel room and located

$104,390.00 in suspected narcotics proceeds, packaged in quick count bundles in a drawer in the

nightstand.

73. A consent search of the target's phone reveled communications with a third party

instructing him to pick-up U.S. currency from an individual on Lexington Avenue in New York

and a post pick-up accounting of a little over $100,000.00. Post-Miranda SANTIZO Colon

stated that he had traveled to the United States on business and that he worked for a very

dangerous man whom he did not wish to implicate because this individual knows where

SANTIZO Colon's family lives and would not hesitate to harm them in retaliation. Upon

arriving in the United States SANTIZO Colon was instructed by his boss to pick up an unknown

amount of currency from an unknown third-party. He stated his belief that the currency in

question was the product of narcotics sales. Further he stated that he was instructed by his boss

to subsequently deliver this money to another unknown individual on today's date. SANTIZO

Colon said that, prior to the incident in question, he had never conducted a money pick-up,

however, a records check revealed that he had been stopped several years prior to this incident

by police in Providence, Rhode Island, with $15,000.00 hidden in his car. SANTIZO Colon is a

Guatemalan citizen visiting the United States on a B 1-B2 visa.

74.

On August 20, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and

requested assistance in picking up approximately $50,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois, of suspected

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narcotic proceeds. This contract was canceled before any contact was made with the HSI/SAC

Chicago undercover agent.

75. Money laundering contracts may be canceled for different reasons. As a

Colombia-based money launderer, LIZARAZO MENDOZA bids for money contracts from

individuals that have narcotics dollars for sale in the United States. LIZARAZO MENDOZA

competes with other money brokers for these contracts. If LIZARAZO MENDOZA is awarded

a contract, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacts CS 1, or another member of his organization, to

arrange the pick-up of the narcotics dollars. There is always a possibility that another money

broker bids lower than LIZARAZO MENDOZA (mid-coordination period) and the contract is

given to another money broker, and his/her contact in the United States will pick up the currency.

There are other times where the money broker offers the contract to a few different money

brokers. In such a case, the organization that can pay out the pesos in Colombia first tends to

receive the contract.

76.

On August 28, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately $50,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia.

This contract was canceled before contact was made with the HSI/SAC Atlanta undercover

agent.

77.

On September 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBMl and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately $170,000.00 in Philadelphia,

Pem1sylvania. The unidentified Latin male was utilizing phone number: 978-701-1330. The

contract was canceled prior to any meeting between a SAC/Philadelphia HSI undercover agent

and target.

Page 39 of 126

78.

On September 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately $100,000.00 in Boston,

Massachusetts. The target in Boston turned off his phone and the contract was canceled. The

contract was canceled prior to any meeting between a SAC/Boston HSI undercover agent and

target.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 5

JESUS VALENCIA

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$67,000.00

79. On September 4, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CSl via BBM1 and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately $100,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois.

This pick up was coordinated with HSI/SAC Chicago. On September 8, 2014, the serial number

of a dollar bill was provided to LIZARAZO MENDOZA and in exchange he provided a

passphrase: "Ruben de parte de Pedro." Additionally, a subpoena was generated for the courier's

phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber

information with the name "James Avery," and a listed address associated with the Sprint

Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

80. On September 9, 2014, a HSIISAC Chicago UC met with an unidentified Latin

male in a Macy's parking lot. This individual was later identified as Jesus VALENCIA, (DOB:

6/15/1982). A records check revealed that VALENCIA has an extensive criminal history,

including, including an outstanding warrant in California for "Crimes Against Persons," and was

previously arrested in that state with over $400,000.00 U.S. currency and a firearm, while

attempting to purchase 18 kilograms of cocaine. On the date in question, VALENCIA dropped a

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red bag containing $67,000.00 to the HSI UC. A subsequent K-9 sniff of the currency delivered

by VALENCIA revealed the presence of the odor of a controlled substance.

81. After verification of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS 1

have the cash laundered through the following accounts

M2 wireless Inc.

7254 NW 31st Street

Miami, Florida 3 3122

Chase Bank

ABA: 267084131

Account:

$30,000.00

Grand Metropolitan Limited

208 Queen's Road Central

Hong Kong

HSBC, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

Account:

$35,660.00

82.

On October 8, 2014, a mobile surveillance was established on VALENCIA and he

was observed traveling with a black backpack. He was eventually driven to a Wells Fargo bank

and made a single deposit of $9000.00. Upon exiting the bank, HSI agents engaged him in a

consensual encounter with VALENCIA and the individual who had driven him to the bank,

Steve CERVANTES. Permission was given to search the vehicle and agents located

VALENCIA's black backpack, which revealed a single quick count bundle containing

approximately $20,000.00 in U.S. currency and two bags of cannabis. In addition to the

currency and controlled substance, additional deposit receipts were located showing that six days

prior, on October 2, 2014, two other deposits of $9000.00 each had been made within ten

minutes of each other into the same account at a different Wells Fargo branch and that one hour

later, an additional $9000.00 had been deposited at Bank of America. A fifth receipt was also

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located showing that the following day, October 3, 2014, another $9000.00 deposit had been

made at Bank of America. When asked about the receipts VALENCIA admitted that he had

been instructed to pick-up large amounts of bulk U.S. cunency and deposit them $9000.00 at a

time to avoid bank reporting requirements. He stated that he could not state with certainty how

the currency was generated, but assumed it was the product of narcotics sales.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 6

SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED

OCTOBER 3, 2014- NEW YORK, NEW YORK

$49,980.00

83.

On October 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CSl via BBMl and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of $100,000.00 in New York, New York. The

pick-up was coordinated with HSI/SAC New York. A subpoena was generated for the courier's

phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber

information with the name "Juan Velez," and a listed address associated with the Sprint

Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone. The passphrase for the

contract was to be "Marcelo de parte de Tio."

84.

On October 3, 2014, a UC made contact with the money courier and the two

agreed to meet later that day at the Pathmark grocery store at 410 West 20i

11

Street, in

Manhattan. Shortly thereafter, an unidentified Latin male walked up to the UC's vehicle and

delivered approximately $49,980.00 in a black duffle bag. The subject then left the location on

foot and proceeded to a nearby gas station where he met up with a second subject and, ultimately

was picked up by a third subject driving a gray Honda Odyssey. Surveillance was maintained on

the subjects' vehicle, however due to the employment of counter-surveillance techniques law

enforcement eventually lost contact with the vehicle. To date the subjects remain unidentified.

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85. Upon verification of the transaction, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO

MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank account:

Times Trading Inc.

1145 SW 23rd Avenue

Miami, Florida, 33135

Account

ABA 062005690

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 7

JOSE ANGEL CORTEZ RAQUEZ

OCTOBER 6, 2014- ATLANTA, GEORGIA

$214,900.00

86.

On October 3, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and

requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately $150,000.00 in suspected

narcotics proceeds in Atlanta, Georgia. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's

subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed no subscriber information or address.

This was a pre-paid phone.

87.

On October 6, 2014, an undercover HSI TFO from SAC Atlanta spoke with the

courier responsible for delivering the money. During the brief conversation the passphrase,

"Raul de parte de Agua," was exchanged and the courier informed the UC that he would be

providing $220,000.00 instead of the previously agreed up $150,000.00. Shortly thereafter, the

two pmiies spoke again and the courier again attempted to change the terms of the exchange to

include a larger amount of currency, however, the UC declined to pick up more than the

$220,000.00 previously agreed upon. Later that same day, a HSI SAC Atlanta UC picked up

what was later determined to be $214,900.00 packaged in quick-count bundles, in a Costco

parking lot in the Atlanta area. The UC observed the courier retrieve the currency from a hidden

compartment located behind the rear seats of the courier's vehicle. The courier then requested

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that the UC place the currency into a black bag inside the courier's vehicle before transferring it

to the UC vehicle. HSI SAC Atlanta subsequently identified the individual in question as Jose

Angel CORTEZ Raquez/Raques/Raquel (DOB: 1/30/1987).

88.

After the pick-up, CSI was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to deposit the

cash into the following bank accounts:

Times Trading Inc.

1145 SW 23rd Ave.

Miami, Florida 33135

Account:

ABA: 062005690

$40,602.00

Times Trading Inc.

1145 SW 23rd Ave.

Miami, Florida 33135

Account:

ABA: 062005690

$40,000.00

Times Trading Inc.

1145 SW 23rd Ave.

Miami, Florida 33135

Account:

ABA: 062005690

20,000.00

Grand Metropolitan Limited

208 Queens Road Central

Hong Kong

Account:

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

$70,000.00

LDN Technology USA

10773 NW 58

111

Street, #248

Miami, Florida 33178

Account:

ABA: 031101266

$40,000.00

Page 44 of 126

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 8

ALONSO RNERA VALENZUELA

OCTOBER 15,2014-DETROIT, MICHIGAN

$62,920.00

89. On October 9, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBMl, with new PIN

2A8671DD, contacted CS1 and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of

approximately $150,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds in Detroit, Michigan. A subpoena

was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena

showed no subscriber information or address. This was a pre-paid phone. CS 1 was instructed

to accept the contract and, thereafter, HSI Miami received and passed on to HSI Detroit, a phone

number of the money courier.

90. On October 10, 2014, an HSI Detroit UC made contact with the courier and they

agreed to conduct the transaction the following week. During the conversation, the passphrase

"Alonso de parte de Luis," was exchanged.

91. On October 15, 2014, the UC spoke with the courier over the phone. During the

call, the courier stated that he did not want to speak over the phone because a few of his

"friends" had recently been "busted" and he was only willing to communicate via text. The two

subsequently agreed to handle the currency exchange in the parking lot of a Home Depot. When

the courier anived at the Home Depot he informed the UC that he was nervous and believed that

he was being followed. He then told the UC that he only had $65,000.00 and handed the UC an

Igloo Playmate cooler containing the funds in question. The currency was then exchanged and

the parties exited the location.

92. A mobile surveillance was established on the subject's vehicle which was

eventually followed back to a Mexican restaurant called "El Asador" located on the corner of

Springwells and Mint Street, in Detroit. The subject exited the vehicle and was observed

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entering the apartment located directly above the restaurant, which has a single white door as an

entrance just south of El Asador' s main entrance. In the following days, a consensual encounter

was conducted at the apartment in question and the courier was positively identified as Alonso

RIVERA VALENZUELA (DOB: 08/25/1983); a Mexican national carrying a Mexican federal

identification card.

93. A final count of the currency picked up on October 15 came out to $62,920.00.

Once the transaction had been verified, CS 1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to

deposit the cash into the following bank accounts:

Titos Depot Corporation

3300 NW 112 Avenue, Suite 9

Doral, Florida

Account:

ABA: 031101266

$20,000.00

LDN Technology USA

10773 NW 58th Street, #248

Miami, Florida 33178

Account:

ABA: 031101266

$25,000.00

Maxpoint USA

8259 NW 66th Street

Miami, Florida

Account:

ABA: 026009593

$16,662.00

94.

On October 16, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM1, contacted CS1

and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of approximately $100,000.00 in suspected

narcotic proceeds in Detroit, Michigan. LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided the following

number: 313-595-4507. This contract was not accepted by CSl. HSI/SAC Miami provided this

Page 46 of 126

information to HSIISAC Detroit. HSI/SAC Detroit made effmis, but was ultimately

unsuccessful in its efforts to identify the subject utilizing phone number: 313-595-4507.

95. On October 18, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM1, contacted CS1

and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of approximately $100,000.00 in suspected

narcotic proceeds in New York, New York. HSI/SAC Miami coordinated with HSI/SAC New

York to assist in identifYing the target in New York, however, ultimately, the contract was

canceled.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 9

JAVIER CASTRO LEYVA

ROBERTO LOPEZ MORALES

DUV AN BOLANOS MORA

FABIO MORENO

NOVEMBER 10, 2014- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$95,000.00

96. On November 7, 2014, using BBM1, LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a

contract to pick up $120,000 in Chicago, Illinois. LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided a "David

de patie de Jorge," as the passphrase. HSI SAC Miami Group 17 Strike-force agents and MDPD

detectives made contact with HSI Chicago and advised them of the investigation. HSI Chicago

utilized an undercover agent to make contact with the courier via telephone and confirmed a

meeting for November 10, 2014, at a shopping mall. The courier in question was using

telephone number 480 469 0726.

97. On November 10, 2014, two couriers met with a UC and gave the UC $95,000.00,

which had been transported in a brown satchel, which further contained a white Armani

Exchange bag. After the transaction a narcotics detecting K -9 gave a positive aleti to the

cunency.

Page 47 of 126

98.

After confirmation of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS 1 to

deposit the cash into the following account:

DISCELL Corporation

7474 Collins Ave.

Miami Beach, Florida

Account

ABA 0260095933

99.

After the transaction was completed, the couriers were followed back to the

Raffaello Hotel at 201 East Delaware Place, in Chicago, and identified as Javier CASTRO

LEYVA (DOB: 3/12/88) and Robetio LOPEZ MORALES (DOB: 5/20/87). Both subjects are

Mexican nationals, traveling under Mexican passpmts.

100. On November 15, 2014, HSI Agents in Chicago retumed to the Raffaello Hotel

and approached CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES as they were exiting the hotel with a

tan satchel which was observed to contain a large bundle of U.S. currency. After a brief

interaction, CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES were asked for consent to search their

room and cell phones, which they both agreed to, signing written consent forms. While in the

room, CASTRO LEYVA spontaneously stated, "We have a problem," and immediately followed

up by inquiring about his custody status. The subjects were told that they were not under anest,

but both men were Mirandized and signed written Miranda forms.

101. After signing the Miranda forms, CASTRO LEYVA was asked what the problem

he had been referring to was. He then stated while in Chicago he was asked by an individual by

the name of Justino GONZALEZ to pick-up bulk U.S. currency on behalf of an individual by the

name of Victor GONZALEZ. He fmiher stated that J. GONZALEZ is V. GONZALEZ's

nephew. J. GONZALEZ's instructions were to pick-up $130,000.00 from an unlmown

individual whom CASTRO LEYVA described as a Mexican who sounded like he was from the

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State of Michoacan. Upon searching the hotel room, agents discovered a backpack and other

bags with a large amount of US Currency and documents supporting money laundering activities

that were being conducted. CASTRO LEYVA stated that he believed the currency was most

likely the product of narcotics sales and that he had often heard V. GONZALEZ's associates

discussing narcotics transactions. Both CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES made

statements that the currency was not theirs and signed proper abandonment forms. The currency,

which totaled $130,000.00, was seized as the proceeds of illicit narcotics sales and subsequently

inspected by a narcotics detection K-9 unit who ale1ied to the presence of a controlled substance

on the currency.

102. While conducting surveillance at the money drop conducted on November 10,

2014, HSI Chicago observed a vehicle occupied by two (2) unknown males who later were

identified as Duvan BOLANOS MORA (DOB: 5/21/90) and Fabio MORENO (DOB: 7/10/93)

conducting counter-surveillance. HSI Chicago conducted surveillance on BOLANOS MORA

and MORENO and followed them to an Extended Stay America hotel located in Des Plaines,

Illinois. Thereafter, BOLANOS MORA and MORENO exited their vehicle with a backpack and

what appeared to be a very heavy duffle bag, which seemed to have contained a square object,

and entered the hotel. Later that evening, HSI Chicago agents made a consensual encounter with

the two men, who were in their hotel room at the time of the approach. Both BOLANOS MORA

and MORENO provided verbal and written consent to search their room, vehicle, and cell

phones. Upon searching the hotel room, HSI Chicago agents observed a shoe box on the couch

containing a large amount of US Currency. Both BOLANOS MORA and MORENO later made

statements that the currency was not theirs and signed proper abandonment forms. The currency

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in question, which totaled $124,990.00, was seized by HSI Chicago as the suspected proceeds of

illicit narcotics sales.

103. After the search, the subjects agreed to be interviewed by HSI and signed written

Miranda waiver forms. BOLANOS MORA stated that he traveled from Cali, Colombia, to

Hialeah, Florida, in July 2014, to visit his friend ("cousin") Fabio MORENO. In Cali,

BOLANOS MORA owns an electronics impmi business called J.M.A. Communicaciones,

located in the Diamante building

7

• He stated that he imports products from the United States for

resale in Colombia for his business and on behalf of other similar businesses. In order to

accomplish this he stated that interested business owners in Colombia would give him large

amounts of U.S. cunency in the form of bulk cash to take with him to the United States, to

purchase products, such as iPhones, which would then be shipped back to Colombia. When

questioned regarding the identity of the businesses and business owners he was holding the

$124,990.00 for, he could not give any names, stating that someone in Colombia that he knew

only as "Andres" had sent him to Chicago to pick up the currency. Moreover, when questioned

about past businesses and individuals he had worked with, he was again unable to provide any

names.

104. BOLANOS MORA went on to state that while in the United States, he had been

contacted by an unknown Latin male with a Dominican accent who told BOLANOS MORA that

a cell phone needed to be delivered to him. BOLANOS MORA then met with the unknown

Latin male who provided him with a brand new LG telephone with a single BlackBerry contact

installed in it, with the name "Andres." A review of the communications on this phone showed

communications between "Andres" and BOLANOS MORA consistent with BMPE transactions.

For example, on November 3, 2014, "Andres" sent a message that consisted of only a phone

7 The Diamante Building is also the operational base for LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA.

Page 50 of 126

number and the number, the word "Esmerlada," and the number "150," indicating the courier to

call, the code-name of the location of the pick-up, and the amount of money in question. On

November 5, 2014, "Andres" sent a message consisting of only a phone number, the words "in

Houston," and the number "130." On November 8, 2014, "Andres" sent a message consisting

only of a phone number and the number "125."

105. Under further questioning, BOLANOS MORA admitted that the November 8,

2014, communication had prompted him to call an unknown individual, fly to Chicago with

MORENA, and pick up the $124,990.00 that was seized in the hotel room. He stated that upon

arrival in Chicago MORENO rented a car and they checked into a motel room. After getting

settled, contact was made with a Mexican money courier and he and MORENO then drove to the

pick-up location. He further indicated that they received money in a red duffle bag in person

from a man they did not know who said only one thing to them, "I'm leaving you in charge of

this." After receiving the money he and MORENO returned to the motel room and together they

counted and repackaged the money into $2000 bundles that BOLANOS MORA was to deposit it

into various bank accounts as directed by "Andres." A further search of the phone revealed

numerous messages from "Andres" with bank account information and dollar amounts to be

deposited.

106. A subsequent detailed analysis of the data extracted from the LG phone in

BOLANOS MORA's possession revealed additional evidence of money laundering both in the

form of financial transactions made to disguise the nature of the proceeds and "structuring" or

"Smurfing," which are transactions designed to avoid reporting requirements under the Bank

Secrecy Act. Moreover, the communications showed "Andres" explaining codes to BOLANOS

MORA. In a communication sent on November 3, 2014, "Andres" stated:

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"TT is your house" (referring to New York; the TT code stands for Twin Towers)

"The R is where you were yesterday" (referring to Chicago; the R code stands for

the Spanish word for wheel, which is rueda- a reference to the large Ferris wheel

on Chicago's Navy Pier)

"Hospital is Houston"

"The stadium is Atlanta"

"Dtr is Detroit"

107. Further translated examples of instructions used for money pick-ups located on

BOLANOS MORA's phone include:

"513-550-4366 on behalf of the white guy. This 1s the number of Cinci

[Cincinnati]."

"And this is the one for the 40 from the R [Chicago] 333-957-4132 ask for the

dollar or the attorney."

"604-652-5940 satacha on behalf of the little black guy."

"604-396-8606 Tomas. Ask if the woman finally delivered the 160 yesterday. If

they ask what was the code tell them Tomas on behalf of Steven."

"But the thing is the cucho from Guadalajara has 130 for me in TT [New York].

Then call 908-248-3993. Omega on behalf of the little wolf."

108. In addition to the pick-up instructions, the phone contained directions to deposit

over $360,000.00, in seventy-seven (77) separate deposits to fifty-three (53) different businesses

and individuals over a period of (12) days. The list of businesses included numerous Florida

based businesses, such as Jr. Unlimited, Miami City Wireless, Mas Communications Tee.,

Carbon Fiber Entertaim11ent, Latch Shoe Corp., O.C. Trading Inc., OGL LLC., all of whom are

Page 52 of 126

located or operate in Miami-Dade County. Of the seventy-seven deposits, more than ninety

percent were indicative of structuring, by limiting the transaction to $10,000.00 or less. Fmiher

evidence of structuring was evinced by the fact that many of the businesses and individuals

received multiple deposits of $10,000.00 or less on the same date, into the same account, which

makes no sense from a business perspective, but is a hallmark of structuring transactions.

1 09. In spite of the evidence to the contrary, contained in his phone, BOLAN OS

MORA denied ever having picked up money in the United States, with the exception of the

money located in his hotel room.

110. On November 18, 2014, BOLANOS MORA was again interviewed, this time by

HSI agents in Miami, Florida. Post-Miranda, he stated that he was actually sent to the United

States by someone he knew only as "Burjo," and that "Burjo" had instructed him to travel from

Hialeah to New York City and await instructions from someone he had never met before known

to him only as "Andres." He stated that MORENO accompanied him on this trip, as well as on a

trip to Chicago, the week before. He was then asked about the phone that was given to him by

the unknown Latin male in New York City, which had a BBM with a username "KAWAGA."

BOLANOS MORA stated that he didn't know the significance of the name KA WAGA and that

it was pre-programed into what was an otherwise brand new phone, still in its original

packaging. He added that after the November 10, 2014, seizure, he threw that phone away and

has lost all contact with "Bmjo."

111. At the inception ofthe interview, BOLANOS MORA was insistent that other than

the $124,990 he pick-up up in Chicago, he had never picked up money for anyone else in the

United States. Later in the interview when he could not explain all of the banking transactions

detailed in his phone, BOLANOS MORA stated that all of these deposits were done pursuant to

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"Andres's" instructions for money picked up by someone he did not know named "Esmeralda"

in New York.

112. When questioned about who the money seized in Chicago belonged to,

BOLANOS MORA stated that he did not know, but that eventually someone would expect him

to repay the loss, but he did not know who or when that would happen. When asked about

family and fi:iends, BOLANOS MORA identified several individuals, including his step-father,

whom he said was Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, born on May 8, 1982. He also identified

an individual he referred to as "W ALLASS" whom he said was well known for working in the

Diamante Building in Cali and that W ALLASS would know who "Andres" was.

113. Subsequently, a source of intelligence from within the money laundering

community in Cali, Colombia, identified BOLANOS MORA as working directly for CASTRO

SANTANA and being in charge of one of CASTRO SANTANA's store fronts in the Diamante

Building where money laundering activities were coordinated. BOLANOS MORA and

MORENO's actions in remaining in the parking lot on the date in question are consistent with

conducting counter-surveillance on behalf of LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO

SANTANA after making a pick-up for them. Large pick-ups are often broken up into smaller

amounts in order to protect the currency from robbery and law enforcement interdiction. In such

a case, for additional security, a member of the organization receiving the currency may act as a

spotter on behalf of the broker they work for in Colombia, keeping him or her apprised of the

status of the transaction or notifying him or her of the presence of suspicious individuals or law

enforcement.

114. On December 1, 2014, using BBM1, LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a

contract to pick up $130,000.00 in Cincinnati, Ohio. This contract was accepted and HSI

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Cincinnati made contact with the money courier using phone number 513-356-0442. Upon

making contact with the money courier, a location was agreed upon to conduct the pick-up,

however, throughout the day, the courier changed the pick-up location on several occasions,

which is consistent with his organization attempting to manipulate a situation for the purpose of

establishing counter-surveillance. The presence of counter-surveillance could have jeopardized

the pick-up in question and, more importantly, ultimately, frustrated the goals of this

investigation. Accordingly, HSI contacted LIZARAZO MENDOZA via CS1 and cancelled the

contract.

115. On December 2, 2014, HSI Miami began intercepting communications from

BBM1 pursuant to a court order signed by the Honorable Ellen Sue Venzer on November 26,

2014.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 10

EDI ACOSTA GAMEZ

DECEMBER 5, 2014- DETROIT, MICHIGAN

$200,000.00

116. On December 4, 2014, Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, using the moniker

"PEDRITO" used BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 ("BBM2" from hereafter) to contact BBM1, inquiring

if LIZARAZO MENDOZA could coordinate a money pick-up of $200,000.00 in Detroit,

Michigan. LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS 1 to inquire his/her availability to pick up the

money in Detroit. CS 1 then passed this information on to HSI Miami who instructed CS 1 to

accept the contract. Upon accepting the contract CASTRO SANTANA sent the courier's phone

number (313-805-7393) and passphrase "Eduardo de parte de Javier," to LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, who subsequently passed the information along to CS 1. CS 1 provided HSI Miami

with the number and pass phrase, which were employed by an HSI UC in Detroit who ultimately

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coordinated the pick-up. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber

information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name

"Andre Perez," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles,

California. This was a pre-paid phone.

117. On December 5, 2014, HSI Detroit met with the courier, later identified as Edi

Alonso ACOSTA GAMEZ

8

(DOB: 11/11/82) in a Home Depot parking lot. At the initial

meeting, the courier stated that he did not have the money, but would return with it shortly. The

courier was followed by law enforcement persom1el, but, ultimately, surveillance had to be

terminated because the subject was engaging in counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

118. An hour and a half later, ACOSTA GAMEZ returned to the Home Depot parking

lot and provided the UC with two shoe boxes containing a total of $200,000.00. After

exchanging the cunency, the courier was again followed by law enforcement personnel and

observed conducting numerous counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

119. Once the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed on wire

instructions to CS 1 to deposit the money into the following business accounts:

Titos Depot Corporation

3300 NW 112 Avenue, Suite 9

Doral, Florida

Account:

ABA: 03110101266

$64,050.00

DISCELL Corporation

7474 Collins Ave.

Miami Beach, Florida

Account

ABA 0260095933

$131,950.00

8 For further details on this subject, see Paragraph 127 through Paragraph 133 below.

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120. On December 7, 2014, an individual using the name "MERCK" employing BBM

PIN 2BAA7EF4 contacted BBM1 to request assistance in picking up $100,000.00 in New York

City. Thereafter, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS 1 to inquire his/her availability to pick

up the money in question. CS 1 passed this information on to HSI Miami who instructed CS 1 to

accept the contract. In this case, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested CS 1 pass him the number

of the individual who would be picking up the money on CS 1 's behalf. CS 1 passed along an

undercover number for an HSI agent in Miami to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. LIZARAZO

MENDOZA then passed this number along to MERCK. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then used

BBM1 to give both MERCK and CS1 the pass phrase that would be used to conduct the pick-up.

HSI Miami then waited for a phone call from MERCK's courier. That same day, HSI Miami

received a call from 475-243-4218 to coordinate the pick-up. The user of number 475-243-4218

identified himself as operating out ofNmihern New Jersey; accordingly, HSI Miami reached out

to HSI Newark to handle the physical pick-up. HSI Newark made contact with the courier who

cancelled the contract. Over the course of intercepting communications on the wire, it was

determined that the courier had cancelled the contract because he believed the HSI Newark UC

to be of Dominican descent. Criminals ofDominican descent in the New York/New Jersey area

are known for conducting robberies of bulk cash pick-up. This is believed to be the reason for

the courier's hesitance to conduct the transaction with someone he believed to be Dominican.

121. Also on December 7, 2014, CASTRO SANTANA used BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 to

contact LIZARAZO MENDOZA on BBM1 to request assistance in picking up $200,000.00 in

Chicago, Illinois. Thereafter, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS 1 to inquire as to his/her

availability to pick up the money in question. CS 1 passed this information on to HSI Miami,

who instructed CS1 to accept the contract. Again, in this case, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

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requested CS 1 to pass him the number of the individual who would be picking up the money on

CS 1 's behalf. CS 1 passed along an undercover number for an HSI agent in Miami to

LIZARAZO MENDOZA. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then passed this number along to CASTRO

SANTANA. The HSI UC in Miami received a phone call from a money courier using 585-409-

3793. HSI stalled the money pick-up, in an attempt to use the courier's phone number to locate

the money before the pick-up and engage in an interdiction operation. Because HSI stalled the

pick-up, the courier ultimately cancelled the contract.

122. On December 8, 2014, pursuant to the judicially authorized wire interception for

this case, HSI began discerning a significant concern among LIZARAZO MENDOZA and the

other money brokers in Colombia regarding the possibility that their phone lines were being

monitored by law enforcement. Communications were intercepted regarding changing both

BBM PINs and SIM cards. Additionally, they discussed turning their phones off. In addition to

LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the following individuals were parties to these conversations: F/N/U

L/N/U utilizing BBM PIN 22A7D6B3, JEAN PAUL, and WPPK.

123. On December 10, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA discontinued use of PIN

2A8671DD and began using PIN 2B984748 to coordinate his money laundering contracts. This

PIN was received by contacting CSl, who had continued to receive communication from

LIZARAZO MENDOZA without interruption, in spite ofthe change ofBBM PINs.

124. On December 10, 2014, on the new BBM PIN associated with BBM1,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested CS1 to assist with picking up $120,000.00 in Chicago,

Illinois. The number for the money courier, 708-261-2817, along with the pass phrase "de parte

del mago," meaning "on behalf of the magician," was passed along to CS 1.

HSI Miami

reached out to HSI Chicago to conduct an undercover pick -up. When HSI Chicago reached out

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to the courier, the UC identified himself as calling on behalf of "mago." The courier was

insistent that the UC come to the courier's residence and count the money, which they referred to

as "tickets." The money courier also stated that there would be "150 tickets" to pick up, instead

of the amount contracted for, which was $120,000.00. HSI was not comfortable sending an

undercover agent into a private location in which they could not exercise any control, because of

the high tln·eat of violence associated with narco-trafficking and money laundering. The UC

attempted to get the courier to change locations for the pick-up and the courier indicated that he

would have to speak to his "boss" who was "down south."

125. Approximately one hour later the UC called the courier back. The courier again

asked whom the UC was calling on behalf of, to which the UC again responded, "Mago." The

courier then informed the UC that there was a new code and to call him back if he was able to

get it from his people. A serial number from a dollar bill was then provided to the UC as the new

passphrase. After exchanging the new code, a series of conversations ensued, but, ultimately the

patiies could not agree on meet location that was acceptable to their respective "bosses" and the

HSI UC cancelled the contract.

126. Throughout the day on December 10, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA was in

communication with CS1 regarding possible money pick-ups in Atlanta, Georgia, and Montreal,

Quebec. BBM1 was used for these communications.

127. On December 11, 2014, surveillance was conducted on Edi ACOSTA GAMEZ,

the money courier from the December 5, 2014, Detroit transaction. A traffic stop was eventually

initiated for the purpose of fully identifying the subject. During the traffic stop, A COST A

GAMEZ told the officer that he had bonowed the vehicle he was driving from a friend and was

on his way to the friend's apmiment to return the vehicle. Subsequent to the traffic stop,

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surveillance continued and instead of returning to an apartment and returning the vehicle,

ACOSTA GAMEZ and his passenger, Jenady Alexis MEDINA OLIVAS (DOB: 4/24/85), drove

to a Target store and were observed searching through the trunk of their vehicle and crawling

beneath the undercaniage of the vehicle with a flashlight. Your affiants are aware that such

behavior is consistent with a professional drug trafficker or money courier inspecting their

vehicle for the presence of a mobile tracking device used by law enforcement to keep tabs on the

subject's movements. Thereafter, the subjects drove to a nearby restaurant and upon exiting the

restaurant repeated the previously described search of the vehicle. Next the subjects drove to a

nearby GameStop store and, again, upon exiting the location engaged in a search of the vehicle.

128. Shortly thereafter, the subjects were observed entering an apartment in Southfield,

Michigan. A consensual encounter was then conducted at the apartment. The subjects were

Mirandized and stated that they were in the United States to for the purpose of visiting some

friends and to go shopping. ACOSTA GAMEZ possessed a valid visa, however, MEDINA

OLIVAS had entered illegally. The two claimed that the apatiment belonged to a friend of theirs

by the name of "Arturo" who lived in Mexico and that the keys had been provided to them in a

restaurant by a woman whom they could not name. A subpoena for the records of the apartment

in question showed that it was currently being rented by a woman named Catherine Dufour, not

the aforementioned "Arturo." Contact with Ms. Dufour led to her declining to speak with law

enforcement and having her attorney, Marvin Smith, stating that he would set up a meeting with

Ms. Dufour at a later date.

129. After speaking with the subjects, agents received written consent to search the

residence, which appeared to be a "stash-house," used to hold bulk-cash prior to laundering it.

Inside the residence agents discovered a false wall cut into the drywall behind a bathroom mirror.

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Inside the wall they discovered numerous notes which contained dollar amounts written on them,

indicative of the location being used for surreptitiously storing money for later distribution.

Fmiher search of the residence revealed a money counter used for processing bulk-currency,

ledgers, rubber-bands, money wrappings, $16,537.00 in small denominations, a closet full of

empty shoe boxes, and approximately 20 to 25 cellular telephones, each with the battery

removed and a calling card rubber-banded around it. Collectively these items are the functional

analogue to an illegal money courier's apothecary; providing all necessary items for the

prosecution of his craft and evincing a long-standing status as a "professional" in this field.

130. When confronted with the evidence and asked for "Arturo's" contact information,

the subjects stated that they did not have any contact information for "Arturo," then invoked their

Fifth Amendment rights. Prior to leaving the residence, HSI property abandonment forms were

signed by each subject, stating their lack of proprietary interest in the items seized.

131. ACOSTA-GAMEZ is a Mexican national from the State of Sinaloa who entered

the United States in October of 2014 on foot via San Ysidro. He has no criminal history in the

United States and refused to cooperate. He has no known permanent address, driver's license, or

bank account.

132. MEDINA-OLIVAS is Mexican national illegally residing in the United States.

He has no criminal history in the United States and refused to cooperate. He has no lmown

permanent address, driver's license, or bank account.

133. On December 18, 2014, a lab repmi for latent fingerprints revealed the presence

of ACOSTA GAMEZ's prints on the exterior of the shoe boxes used to transport the currency

picked-up by HSI Detroit on December 5, 2014.

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RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 11

SIDIA MILADY LIZARAZO MENDOZA

ALEJANDRO LEON VEGA

DECEMBER 23,2014- MIAMI, FLORIDA

$174,440.00

134. On December 22, 20I4, AI 's phone number was provided to Ivan LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, by CS I to coordinate a pick-up with an individual in Miami, Florida, for $I75,000.

This individual was later identified as Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA. Subsequently AI

received a phone call Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA (DOB: 4/2I/76), using phone

number 404-997-9208 and employing the passphrase, "Sebastian Valentina." A subpoena for the

subscriber information associated with this phone revealed that it was subscribed to under a

fictitious name, "Paulo Perez," with a date of birth of April 30, I958, and no listed address or

payment infonnation. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested to meet that same day.

AI instructed her that he was unavailable at the moment, but could meet her the following day.

135. On December 23, 20I4, at approximately 8:00a.m. AI received a call from Sidia

Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA using the same target number. She requested to meet with A I

earlier than initially anticipated. AI suggested meeting with the target at the Dolphin Mall in the

City of Doral, however, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA declined to meet there because

she believed there were too many people at that location. AI agreed to meet with her at

approximately 1:00 p.m. at a Starbucks in Doral. In place of Al, MDPD UC, Detective Gil

Crespo, met with Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, however, she was not aware that

Detective Crespo and Al were actually two different individuals. When Sidia Milady

LIZARAZO MENDOZA arrived, she gave Detective Crespo a bag containing a shoe box with

$I74,440 in U.S. currency, packaged in quick count bundles.

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136. Thereafter, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS 1 to have

the money wired to the following account:

Movil Singapore, Ltd.

6 Battery Road

#03-01

Singapore,049909

Account

Swift SCBLSG22

$170,951.00

136. Based on information subsequently documented in this affidavit, it is believed that

the money dropped off in Miami had been originally picked up in Atlanta, Georgia, by Sidia

Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and her husband, Alejandro LEON VEGA (DOB: 3/4/81).

Although LEON VEGA was not seen during the course of this transaction, he is known to assist

Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA in illegally transporting currency, as is detailed in the

January 30, 2015, transaction discussed below, and he can be linked to this transaction in the

following ways:

1.

LEON VEGA's credit card was used to purchase two one way plane tickets to

Atlanta the week of this transaction.

2.

LEON VEGA and Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA were the passengers

listed on the tickets for the flight to Atlanta.

3.

Immediately upon arriving in Atlanta, LEON VEGA's credit card was used to

rent a vehicle, which promptly returned to South Florida the following day.

4.

LEON VEGA's phone number (404) 955-0972 was used as the contact

information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.

5.

LEON VEGA's email address yancha04@hotmail.com was used as the contact

information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.

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6.

During Al 's phone call directly before the pick-up, a male voice could be heard

asking Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA about the transaction.

7.

When Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA dropped the money off, she was

driving a 2011 Toyota Camry with New Jersey plate number UUX20T. That

license plate was traced back to a Toyota Camry owned by and registered to

LEON-VEGA.

137. The methods oftravel associated with Sidia Milady LIZARAO MENDOZA and

LEON VEGA's trip are inconsistent with legitimate business activity or personal business,

however, they are consistent with the fashion in which BMPE couriers move money prior to

depositing it with a financial institution. Flights are used to travel to the location where the

money is being housed, but cars are almost exclusively used for the return trip to the courier's

base of operations, because public transportation, especially air travel, exposes the courier to

security personnel, drug and cunency detecting K-9 units, X-ray screenings, etc.

138. Additionally, the times oftravel are inconsistent with legitimate business activity

or personal business. The vehicle was rented at 12:30 a.m. on December 19, 2014. It was

returned in Ft. Lauderdale at 12:30 a.m. on December 20, 2014. This left precious little time for

anything other than sleep while in Atlanta.

139. Finally, the planning of the travel is inconsistent with legitimate business activity

or personal business. The airline tickets were purchased the same day as the flight and the rental

car was not secured until after arrival in Atlanta.

140. On January 3, 2015, HSI and MDPD again began intercepting communications

from Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA's BBM PIN pursuant to a court order signed by the

Honorable Ellen Sue Venzer on December 24, 2014.

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RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 12

AMBIORIS A COST A DE LA CRUZ

JANUARY 6, 2015 -NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

$197,984.00

141. On January 5, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CSl accept a

contract for $200,000, in New York. A2 instructed CS 1 to accept the contract and subsequently

passed this information on to HSI in New York. A phone number for a HSI UC in New York

was passed the number to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed

the phone number along to the along to the target. The following day, the HSI UC received a

phone call from 347-987-2044. The passphrase, "Wilder de parte de Jaime," was exchanged at

the front end of the conversation. The caller stated that he could not drive and had no means of

getting to New York, so the two agreed to conduct the transaction the following day in Northern

New Jersey, at a strip mall located at 632 State Street, in Perth Amboy.

142. On January 6, 2015, the HSI UC picked up $197,984.00 from an unknown Latin

male who was traveling on foot. This individual was subsequently identified as Ambrioris

ACOSTA de la CRUZ (DOB: 9/8/74). The currency was contained within a box designed to

house an Xbox gaming system, being transported inside of a shopping bag. It was further

wrapped in an interior plastic bag and then divided into quick-count bundles which were either

wrapped in plastic-wrap or tightly packaged and sealed within zip-lock bags. ACOSTA de la

CRUZ was subsequently followed back to an apartment building at 169 Hall Street, in Perth

Amboy, but the unit he entered could not be identified.

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143. After verifying the completion of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

provided instructions to CS 1 to have the money wired to the following accounts:

Hair and Accessories, Inc.

4620 NW 12S1h Street

Opa Locka, FL 33054

Account

ABA 121 000248

$11,000.00

Inversiones Recug Ca

Ave. Lara Calle 8 Centro Commercial

Barquisimento, Venezuela

Account

ABA 067015779

$40,000.00

Tecknopark USA

10773 NW 581h Street,

Miami, FL 3 3178

Account

ABA 266086554

$68,684.00

LDN Technology USA

10773 NW 581h Street,

Miami, FL 33178

Account

ABA 067014822

$32,120.00

Jeffrey Cohn

211 5th Avenue,

New York, NY 10017

Account

ABA 026009768

$14,000.00

IMES

3585 NW 10ih Avenue,

Doral, FL 33178

Account

ABA 067014822

$28,221.00

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144. On January 10, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CSI accept a

contract for $200,000, in New Jersey. A2 instructed CS 1 to turn down the contract.

145. On January 11, 2015, a New York UC received a call from an unknown Hispanic

male utilizing telephone number 347-987-2044. The UHM requested to meet at the same

location as the previous pick-up which occmTed on January 6, 2015. The UC advised the UHM

he/she would get back to him. The UC then disabled his UC telephone at the request of HSI

Miami.

146. On January 13, 2015, A2 observed a communication between CASTRO

SANTANA, using BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 and LIZARAZO MENDOZA, inquiring if

LIZARAZO MENDOZA could coordinate a money pick-up of $200,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia.

LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the number of 404-997-9208 to CASTRO SANTANA

signifying that the user of this phone was available to pick up the requested currency. This is the

same number used by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA when she dropped off $174,440 in

Miami, in December. A pen register and trap and trace device were employed on the phone used

by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and a mobile tracking device was placed on LEON

VEGA's vehicle to gather evidence and track their movements. The phone in question was only

being used in a very limited capacity, consistent with a phone being used for compartmentalized

illegal activity. In fact, this phone was often shut-off for days at a time, then briefly turned back

on, which, again, is consistent with a phone being used for the limited purpose of conducting an

illegal money drop.

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RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 13

FRANCISCO HARO RODRIGUEZ

JANUARY 15, 2015- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$84,780.00

147. On January 14, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 accept a

contract for $90,000.00, in Chicago. This contract had been given to LIZARAZO MENDOZA

by CASTRO SANTANA on January 13. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract and

subsequently A2 passed this information on to HSI in Chicago, Illinois. A phone number for a

HSI UC in Chicago was passed to MOQUERA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the

phone number along to the owners of the currency and provided CS 1 with the passphrase, "con

mollo departe de Panzon," which loosely translates to "with the dark-skinned one, on behalf of

the potbellied." Later that day, the HSI UC received a phone call from 872-218-1560 from an

individual who stated that he was calling on behalf of "Panzon" and wished to speak to "Mollo."

This individual, subsequently identified as Francisco HARO RODRIGUEZ (DOB: 3/1/89)

discussed dropping off a "package," with the UC the following day. The UC asked how many

"tickets" there were and HARO RODRIGEUZ responded, "eight, five."

148. On January 15, 2015, the HSI UC picked up $84,780 in a white plastic Disney

shopping bag from HARO RODRIGUGEZ in a mall parking lot outside of Chicago. The

cunency was concealed inside of a box contained in the Disney bag and was packaged in

bundles wrapped in bubble packaging. A latent fingerprint matching HARO RODRIGUEZ's

left ring finger was subsequently developed from the box containing the cunency. After the

transaction, a trained narcotics detecting K-9 unit alerted to the presence of a controlled

substance on the currency.

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149. After verification of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided

instructions to CS 1 to have the money wired to the following account:

Global Honest Enterprises Limited

208 Queens Road Central

Hong Kong

Account:

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

150. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 14

SIDIA MILADY LIZARAZO MENDOZA

ALEJANDRO LEON VEGA

JANUARY 30,2015-MIAMI, FLORIDA

$199,740.00

151. On January 30, 2015, MDPD Robbery Detective Dave Richards advised that at

approximately 3:45 a.m., the telephone belonging to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA was

shutdown. Immediately prior to being turned off, the phone was located on Miami Beach, in

Miami, Florida. Det. Richards advised that at 10:30 a.m., Sidia Milady LIZARAZO

MENDOZA's telephone turned back on inside Atlanta International Airport, in Atlanta, Georgia.

Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA called telephone number 404-901-8592, then made a

brief stop at a shopping center in the Atlanta area. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's

telephone was then tracked traveling south towards Miami. A2 then received information from

CS 1 that Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA would be calling our UC phone number from

telephone number 404-997-9208 at or around 8:00 p.m. to coordinate a money drop of

$200,000.00, and that the passphrase would be "Mariana de patie de Victor."

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152. At 7:45p.m., A1 received a call from Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA but

did not answer. MDPD Robbery Detective Jason Gambill advised that, based on the tracking

capabilities associated with the pen register and trap and trace device attached to Sidia Milady

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's number, the phone was still heading towards the South Florida area.

MDPD and HSI agents mobilized and headed toward the area of the Ft. Lauderdale International

Airport, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Upon arrival, A 1 observed Sidia Milady LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, Alejandro LEON-VEGA and a third individual, Felipe GIRALDO, dropping off a

rental car and picking up the vehicle previously driven by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, the 2011 Toyota Camry, which was still registered to LEON-VEGA, but now with

Florida tag BJAE16.

153. At approximately 9:15 p.m., a mobile surveillance was established on the

subjects' vehicle until a marked MDPD Police vehicle, being driven by Officer Raul Bacallao,

conducted a traffic stop for an improper lane change in the area of 164th Street and Collins

A venue, in Sunny Isles Beach, Miami-Dade County, Florida. Upon Officer Bacallao making

contact with all occupants of the vehicle, he observed the occupants to be extremely nervous and

concerned about the traffic stop. Officer Bacallao obtained verbal consent to search the vehicle

from LEON-VEGA who is the owner of the vehicle. Upon searching the vehicle, Officer

Bacallao observed a backpack and a smaller bag with a large amount of U.S. currency in quick

count bundles. Officer Bacallao then notified A1 of the results of his search. Upon arrival, Al

made contact with all parties involved. The subjects were read Miranda per form by A2 and

each waived their Fifth Amendment rights.

154. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA was subsequently interviewed by A2 and

SA Xavier Mmtinez stated that they had flown to Atlanta that morning, rented a car, driven to a

Page 70 of 126

Walmart, and received the currency from an individual usmg the name "Victor," with an

unknown last name, and driven directly back to Miami. She stated that the money was hers and

that she was going to use it to purchase cell phones to be exported to Cali, Colombia. She also

acknowledged having a bank account with Bank of America, but did not explain why she chose

to fly to Atlanta to pick up the currency, as opposed to having it place into her account. She also

failed to explain why she took the risk of driving with $200,000 from Atlanta to Miami, when

she could have simply deposited the currency at any one of the numerous Bank of American

branches in Atlanta.

155. According to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the purpose of the trip to

Atlanta was to pick up the currency in question. She stated that she did not know anything about

the individual who delivered the currency, but that he was a Mexican named Victor and that he

arrived at the Walmart parking lot in a taxi cab, handed her a bag, which contained the $200,000,

and that he promptly left without either pmiy requesting or receiving a receipt or any other form

of documentation to establish that the currency exchange took place. When asked for details

regarding the customer whom she would be shipping the cell phones to, she stated that it was a

new client. When pressed further, she admitted that she did not know the name of this client and

did not have any contact information for this client.

156. During the course of the interview, a MDPD Narcotics Detection Canine Unit,

being handled by Detective Jorge Rodriguez, was brought on scene and positively aletied to the

presence of narcotics on the U.S. currency. At this time, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA

appeared increasingly nervous and stated that she was not the true owner of the money and that it

belonged to an individual named Andres RODRIGUEZ, although she did not provide any

additional information substantiating the existence or identity of this person.

Page 71 of 126

157. After speaking with Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, A2 and SA Xavier

Mmiinez interviewed LEON VEGA. He stated that he was traveling with his fiance, Sidia

Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, so that they could deliver wedding invitations for their friends

and family in Georgia. He stated that the wedding was to take place on February 14, 2015, and

that they were to give the invitations to his mother, at a Walmart parking lot in Atlanta. When

asked about the currency in the vehicle, LEON VEGA stated that he had no idea how it came

into Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's possession, but that it belonged to her cell phone

exportation business. He made no mention of meeting a Mexican named Victor or picking up

currency while in Atlanta.

158. Next, Felipe GIRALDO was interviewed. GIRALDO described the purpose of

the trip as a quick vacation. He stated that he believed they had met LEON VEGA's mother at a

Walmmi in Atlanta, but that he had never seen her while they were there. He stated that after the

stop at the Walmart, the trio immediately started driving to Miami. Regarding the cunency,

GIRALDO stated that he had no idea how it came into Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's

possession and had not seen anyone deliver anything to her while they were in Atlanta, but that

he believed it belonged to her cell phone expmi business.

159. Prior to releasing the subjects, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's cell

phones were seized. A phone extraction was conducted pursuant to her consent on what was

determined to be her personal phone. This phone contained contact information for many of the

individuals being intercepted on the wiretap being conducted on Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA's

BBM PIN. The other phone was an outdated model, similar to a tracfone, which was incapable

of being extracted. A search of this phone was also conducted pursuant to Sidia Milady

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's consent, revealing a similar contacts list, and showed

Page 72 of 126

communications associated with the money pick-up conducted in Miami, Florida, on December

23, 2014, and with the money pick-up conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, earlier in the day.

160. Subsequently, each subject signed a propetiy abandonment form in regards to the

U.S. cunency. This seizure was processed by HSI Miami Group 17.

161. While Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA is the direct point of contact for the

Colombian money brokers under investigation, LEON VEGA's culpability in this transaction is

apparent for the following reasons:

1. The day before the scheduled pick-up three plane tickets for Atlanta were purchased,

one ofwhich was in the name of LEON VEGA.

2. The tickets were one-way.

3. Immediately upon arriving in Atlanta, LEON VEGA's credit card was used to rent a

vehicle, which promptly returned to South Florida the same day.

4. LEON VEGA's phone number (404) 955-0972 was used as the contact information

for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.

5. LEON VEGA's email address yancha04@hotmail.com was used as the contact

information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.

6. After returning the rental car, LEON VEGA's vehicle was used to transport the

$200,000 which had been picked up in Atlanta.

7. While on scene, LEON VEGA admitted that he knew the money was in the car, but

claimed that he had no idea how it came into their possession.

8. This was the second time in approximately one month that LEON VEGA had

followed this same course of behavior, traveling to Atlanta by air, immediately

Page 73 of 126

returning by car, and then employing his personal vehicle to facilitate a BMPE

transaction.

162. Among other things, it stretches the limits of credulity to believe that LEON

VEGA would have traveled to Atlanta on such short notice, in such a circumspect fashion, to

drop off invitations to a wedding that was taking place in a mere two weeks' time, with his

mother. It also makes no sense that they did not stay in Atlanta for more than a couple of hours,

meet somewhere other than a Walmart parking lot, and that they chose to drive all the way back

to Miami from Atlanta. Moreover, the fact that both Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

GIRALDO gave entirely different accounts of the purpose of the trip -to pick up currency and a

vacation, respectively- shows LEON VEGA's intent to hide his involvement and knowledge of

the illegality of the conduct

9

.

163. The day following the seizure, January 31, 2015, around 9:30a.m., CASTRO

SANTANA ceased using BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6. This fact was discerned from the lack of

activity appearing on the pen register and trap and trace device attached to CASTRO

SANTANA's BBM.

164. Sometime shortly thereafter, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA ceased using BBM

PIN 2B984748. According to CS1, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA told him that he dropped his

BBM PIN because the phone used by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, which had been

used to coordinate multiple money pick-ups, had been seized by law enforcement. Your Affiants

9 Further indicia of Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and LEON VEGA's criminal culpability was

documented when MDPD, in conjunction with HSI SAC Miami, executed a search warrant for a phone located in

the couple's shared residence in September of2015. That device contained BBM communications from February of

20 15discussing the fact that an attorney named Oscar was looking into a seizure- this is consistent with information

intercepted over the wire in February of 2015, which showed that a Miami based attorney, Oscar Rodriguez, has

being used by the owners of the currency to look into this seizure. The communications also indicated that

"bandidos," a/k/a "bandidos criminates, " a term used in Colombia to refer to professional kidnappers and

murderers, were harassing one of them and that they were afraid. One pmticular communication directs the pmty on

the other line to lie to law enforcement if interrogated and to provide fake names, telephone numbers and BBM

PINs. Subsequently, both parties to the communication express fear of going to jail.

Page 74 of 126

believe CASTRO SANTANA dropped his phone for the same reason, which is reasonable in

light of the fact that CASTRO SANTANA was the source of each of the contracts accepted by

Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, and suppmied by communications between Ivan

LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA which are described in detail below.

Regardless, CS 1 advised that Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA was now using BBM PIN

2B96469A.

165. On February 2, 2015, HSI Miami began intercepting communications from BBM

PIN 2B984748 pursuant to a comi order, however, because LIZARAZO MENDOZA had ceased

using this BBM PIN, these communications consisted only of individuals attempting to

communicate with LIZARAZO MENDOZA and an abject lack of responses on the pmi of

LIZARAZO MENDOZA. BlackBeny was requested to immediately begin supplying HSI with

interceptions on the new BBM PIN being used by LIZARAZO MENDOZA, however, due to

delays in BlackBeny's legal department, interception did not commence for roughly one week

and the first interception on the new BBM PIN was not received until February 10,2015.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 15

AMBIORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ

FEBRUARY 5, 2015-NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

$150,150.00

166. On February 3, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CSI accept a

contract to pick-up $150,000, in Newark, New Jersey. A2 instructed CS 1 to accept the contract.

A UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

passed the phone number along to the target. Later that day, A1 received a phone call from 732-

824-9539, in which the passphrase "Mauricio de parte de Jorge" was exchanged. That individual

Page 75 of 126

discussed meeting with A1 on Thursday, February 5, 2015, in New Jersey to drop off the money.

Al then traveled to Newark, New Jersey, to conduct this pick-up.

167. On February 4, 2015, A1 received a phone call from 732-824-9539, in which the

caller stated the agreed upon passphrase. The caller advised that he would meet A1 at 1:00 p.m., at

a Dunkin Donuts. The caller then sent Al an address, 632 State Street, Perth Amboy, New Jersey,

via text message, as the pick-up location for the transaction. This was the same address as the

transaction conducted on January 6, 2015.

168. On February 5, 2015, A1 acting in the undercover capacity responded to 632 State

Street, to meet with the money courier. Upon Al 's anival, the courier approached on foot and

made contact with AI. This individual was subsequently identified as the same courier from the

January 6, 2015, transaction, Ambioris Antonio ACOSTA de la CURZ. ACOSTA de la CRUZ

gave A1 a heavy black gym bag which contained $150,150.00 in US Cunency. ACOSTA de !a

CRUZ did not speak to AI, other than to state, "via con Dios," meaning may God be with you, as

he walked away. HSI Newark then followed A COST A de la CRUZ back to the same apmiment

building located at 169 Hall A venue, and were able to discern that A COST A de la CRUZ lived

within Unit 1. Subsequently, AI was shown a driver's license photo of ACOSTA de la CRUZ

and positively identi±led him as the money courier.

169. After the transaction was veri±led, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions

to CS 1 to have the money wired to the following accounts:

A TI Solutions

8273 NW 66 St

Miami, FL 33166

Account

ABA 121 000248

$60,000.00

Page 76 of 126

Alimentos Ia Fontana c.a.

Calle Marino sur N. 104

Maracay, Venezuela

Account

ABA 067010509

$87,137.00

170. On February 8, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 on BBM1 and

requested that CS 1 pick up $190,000.00 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A2 ultimately instructed

CS 1 to fain various scheduling conflicts to avoid having to accept this contract.

171. As previously stated, on February 10, 2015, HSI Miami began intercepting

communications on LIZARAZO MENDOZA's new BBM PIN, 2B96469A, pursuant to this

comi's roving interception order.

172. On February 17, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA used BBM1 to communicate

with CRISTO, who employs BBM PIN 52FB6349. LIZARAZO MENDOZA reached out to

CRISTO regarding a quote for laundering money via a frequently used business owned by

Lillian Lucero LARREA. CRISTO replied that Lucero LARREA was no longer a reliable

associate, stating that Lucero LARREA had been approached by federal agents, whom

LIZARAZO MENDOZA and other members of the extended conspiracy refer to as "amigos,"

(Session 5309) which is the Spanish word for "friends." Thereafter, CRISTO told LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, "Y a un senor. Que tenie negocios con ella le llegaron cartas del las tres letras,"

(Session 5328) which translates to, "And a guy that had business with her received

correspondence from the three letters," which is a veiled reference to an American federal law

enforcement agency, such as the FBI, DEA, ATF, or HSI. In response to this information,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CRISTO that he needed someone new to work with in Lucero

LARREA's place. CRISTO told LIZARAZO MENDOZA that an individual named "ARIEL"

could provide the necessary services. CRISTO asked for a name to pass along to ARIEL, to

Page 77 of 126

which LIZARAZO MENDOZA replied "Carlos." CRISTO specifically noted that he had

worked with ARIEL in the past and that ARIEL had funds available, referred to as "Fabric"

(Session 5414) via Hong Kong, referenced as "HK" (Session 5414 ).

173. Later on February 17, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA sent a BBM request to

ARIEL, which was subsequently accepted. LIZARAZO MENDOZA and ARIEL then discussed

the sale of cell phones and payment to an HSBC account in Hong Kong (Session 5680). During

their conversation LIZARAZO MENDOZA verified his location as being in Cali, Colombia,

(Session 5555) while ARIEL identified his location as Miami, Florida (Session 5530). ARIEL

also discussed the safest methods of depositing money into accounts in Hong Kong in light of

current financial regulations (Session 5549).

174. Analysis of BBM conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing

BBM: 2B96469A as "Jacobo" and ANA MARIA, utilizing BBM: 28972736, as "Mariana,"

shows that they are discussing Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and that Ivan LIZARAZO

MENDOZA and Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA are communicating using Ivan

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's assistant, ANA MARIA, as an intermediary.

175. On February 20, 2015, (Session 9249) LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised an

individual that works for him under the BBM moniker "ANA MARIA" to tell LIZARAZO

MENDOZA to "call the lawyer, that he just spoke to him, and she has not told him how all the

events occurred. That she only answered the questions the lawyer asked her. Have her call him

to set up a meeting. That she should not tell the attorney that they rented a car and that they were

returning the car in Miami because it would make them expose themselves.

10

" Subsequently

(Session 9268), LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked through ANA MARIA, "Who should I call?

10 This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

Page 78 of 126

Oscar Rodriguez?

11

" It is believed that Oscar Rodriguez is an attorney that TADEO has hired to

find out what happened to the $200,000.00 that was seized from LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

CASTRO SANTANA.

176. Thereafter (Session 9277), Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised ANA MARIA

to tell Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA to tell Oscar Rodriguez everything she told the

"Homeland" people, referring to HSI. Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded to ANA

MARIA by instructing her to tell LIZARAZO MENDOZA that the lawyer himself, "Tony,

12

"

told Oscar that the agents said that there were some anonymous calls, that they "ratted on us; I

am talking to lawyers, writing documents and my family is here asking what is happening.

13

"

(Session 9286) Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed ANA MARIA to tell Ivan

LIZARAZO MENDOZA that nothing is right and that he, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, should

come up to Miami and help her (Session 9287). Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded

through ANA MARIA that he will handle it from Colombia (Session 9290).

177. On February 23, 2015, CS 1 received a communication from LIZARAZO

MENDOZA using BBM1 requesting that he pick up $100,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. A2

instructed CS1 to accept the contract. A UC number was then passed to CS1 who passed the

number to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. Pursuant to the current wire intercept it was determined

that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was offered the contract via TUNES, who employs BBM PIN

2BD4FFF4. This contract was ultimately cancelled because LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

TUNES could not agree on an exchange rate for the pesos and dollars involved in the

transaction.

11 This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

12 "Tony" is believed to refer to Attorney Tony Alvarez, whom LIZARAZO MENDOZA had hired to represent her

in this matter.

13 This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

Page 79 of 126

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT DELTA

AMBIORIS A COST A DE LA CRUZ

FEBRUARY 27,2015-NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

$183,595.00

178. On February 27, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA used BBM1 in communications

with Hugo BOSS to coordinate a $200,000.00 money pick-up in New York, New York.

LIZARAZO MENDOZA then offered this contract to CS 1. Pursuant to instructions by HSI

Miami, CS 1 accepted this contract, however, no phone number or pass phrase were ever

exchanged.

179. Subsequent to the above referenced communications, at 6:45 p.m., on February

27, 2015, HSI New Jersey conducted a seizure of $183,595.00 by surveilling Ambioris Antonio

ACOSTA de la CRUZ, the money courier responsible for the transactions conducted on January

6, 2015, and February 5, 2015. ACOSTA de la CRUZ was seen meeting with two individuals in

front of the Dunkin Donuts in the strip mall located at 632 State Street, in Perth Amboy; the

same location that ACOSTA de la CRUZ had used to conduct the January 6, and February 5,

money drops. A COST A de la CRUZ was seen passing a black duffle bag to an individual

subsequently identified as Ruddy Haroldo PINTO SIGUENZA, who placed the bag into the bed

of a pick-up truck and departed.

180. Shortly thereafter, a traffic stop was conducted on the pick-up truck being driven

by PINTO SIGUENZA. PINTO SIGUENZA and the passenger Luis Enrique ORELLANA PEC

were asked for consent to search the vehicle. Pursuant to their consent, agents located the black

duffel bag that had been passed from A COST A de la CRUZ to PINTO SIGUENZA and

observed it to be filled with U.S. currency packaged in quick-count bundles. Neither PINTO

SIGUENZA nor ORELLANA PEC could adequately explain the reason for their trip or the

presence ofthe currency, which was subsequently seized.

Page 80 of 126

181. On March 6, 2015, HSI Miami continued intercepting communications on

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's new BBM PIN, 2B96469A, pursuant to this court's roving

interception order which was signed on March 4, 2015.

182. On March 6, 2015 at approximately 21:08 hours HSI/SAC Miami intercepted

several communications between BBM PIN 2bbf2cce, used by an individual named MONTILLA

SAMBONI, known as "ALFARITO," and BBM PIN 2b77daed, used by CASTRO SANTANA.

During these communications, ALF ARITO sent a transcript of his conversation with an

individual identified as "TADEO." TADEO appears to be the owner ofthe $199,740.00 that was

seized in Miami on January 30, 2015. TADEO stated that ALFARITO's brother-in-law

(refetTing to CASTRO SANTANA) was refusing to pay him, that the blame for the seizure was

with CASTRO SANTANA's people, and that CASTRO SANTANA should pay to avoid

compounding his problems. TAD EO stated to ALF ARITO that they will send the bill to the

"office," which is believed to be a reference to "La Oficina de Envigado," a/k/a "La Oficina,"

which is a Colombia-based bill collecting organization, specializing in kidnapping, murder, and

extortion, used by narco-traffickers to collect debts owed.

183. The transcript sent from ALFARITO to CASTRO SANTANA showed the

following exchange, translated from Spanish into English, between TAD EO and ALF ARITO:

TADEO: "I can cetiainly assure you that you are going to have a big problem for being

such RATS."

ALFARITO: "My man, you know that we are not thieves. With all due respect."

TADEO: "Just leave it like that. When they have them tied up, do not ask for their

release, because you will see how a collection is done."

Page 81 of 126

184. TADEO also stated that he would show them who had the power and would make

them pay. During the conversation, ALF ARITO continually referred to T ADEO as "sir,"

showing a respect of or fear for this person. This conversation was clearly in reference to

TADEO turning collection of the debt for the seized money over to professional kidnappers. In

response CASTRO SANTANA contacted LIZARAZO MENDOZA to continue on to discuss the

need for them to establish the culpability of a third party for the seized money. As described in a

subsequent section of this affidavit, a little more than a month later, La Oficina would make an

approach on LIZARAZO MENDOZA while CASTRO SANTANA was conveniently out of

sight.

185. On March 7, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA using the

"ANTONIO" BBM PIN and moniker and LIZARAZO MENDOZA using the JACOBO BBM

PIN and moniker was intercepted in reference to the $200,000.00 seizure in Miami, Florida, on

January 30, 2015. They were trying to figure out if law enforcement was following their courier

from Atlanta or if the source of the law enforcement action originated in Miami. Fmiher, they

stated that they needed the lawyers working the matter to get some form of paperwork or

information showing who was responsible for law enforcement interdicting the money.

CASTRO SANTANA also advised LIZARAZO MENDOZA that the owners of the money still

want to get paid. They then discussed the money being narcotics proceeds and that they needed

to find out who was at fault, because one of them would be held responsible for the seized

money. LIZARAZO MENDOZA reassured CASTRO SANTANA that his people (LIZARAZO

MENDOZA, et. al.) have not lied to him. He also stated that he has paid a good amount of

money retaining an attorney to make sure that Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA did not get

deported.

Page 82 of 126

186. On March 10, 2015, a conversation between NOSTRADAMUS ACERO and

LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in reference to a $210,000.00 contract in which they

talked about breaking up the $210,000.00 into three payments of$70,000.00 apiece. LIZARAZO

MENDOZA then sent to NOSTRADAMUS ACERO a telephone number 305-333-1017 and the

name Lilian Tech Cell, referring to Lilian Lucero LARREA, and the pass phrase of "de patie de

el cliente de Carlos Atortua." LIZARAZO MENDOZA told NOSTRADAMUS ACERO that

Lucero LARREA has an account in Hong Kong and to put the whole $210,000.00 into that

account.

187. On March 11, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CSl, accept a

contract to pick-up $100,000.00 in New York, New York. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the

contract. An HSI New York UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the target. LIZARAZO MENDOZA

advised CS 1 that he needed an office to conduct the pickup. HSI was unable to obtain an office

location so the contract was cancelled.

188. On March 11, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1, accept a

contract to pick-up $100,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the contract.

An HSI Chicago UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO

MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the target. This contract was cancelled prior to

HSI receiving a phone call from the target money courier.

189. On March 13, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1, accept another

contract to pick-up $100,000.00 in Chicago Illinois. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the contract.

An HSI Chicago UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA via CS 1. This contract

was also cancelled prior to HSI receiving any phone call.

Page 83 of 126

190. On March 16, 2015, A2 observed a conversation between CHUCHO (2BBF59F2)

and LIZARAZO MENDOZA talking about $200,000.00 in Guatemala. LIZARAZO

MENDOZA then reached out to numerous individuals in an attempt to find a business pminer for

the contract. This conversation between CHUCHO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA ended because

they could not come to agreement on the cost of the dollar.

191. On March 16, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a conversation reference a

bank account belonging to a "Margarita Rosa Bedoya." LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the

account number to VITO CORLEONE and advised to deposit there. After further investigation,

it is believed that Ms. Magarita Rosa Bedoya was born in Colombia on 08/25/1964 and has a

Non-Immigrant B1/B2 visa. Ms. Bedoya has traveled to the United States on several occasions

to conduct business. Ms. Bedoya has no criminal history in the United States, no known address,

no driver's license or vehicles registered in her name, and has no readily discernible ties to

LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

192. On March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and NOSTRADAMUS ACERO

had a conservation reference to contracts in multiple locations. They discussed $100,000.00 in

Guatemala and $71,000.00 in San Diego, California. NOSTRADAMUS ACERO also stated that

he had $50,000.00 in Manhattan, in New York City, at the rate of 2100. NOSTRADAMUS

ACERO also asked for the address, telephone number, and name of a business or office in

Manhattan.

193. On March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and FRENCH MONTANA had a

conversation reference a money contract in New York, New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA

advised FRENCH MONTANA he had $200,000.00 for cash on delivery with the same man from

Page 84 of 126

before. FRENCH MONTANA responded by stating that he could not help because business has

been slow since January.

194. Also on March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and FRENCH MONTANA

had a conversation reference a money contract in Tijuana, Mexico, for $500,000.00. No further

information was received reference this contract.

195. On March 21, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CHUCHO had a conversation

reference a money contract for $400,000.00 in Guatemala. LIZARAZO MENDOZA further

advised CHUCHO the $400,000.00 was cash on delivery. No further information has been

received reference this contract.

196. On March 23, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and JUNIOR had a conversation

reference a money contract of $100,000.00 in Houston, Texas. JUNIOR asked LIZARAZO

MENDOZA for the number (possibly referring to telephone number) for the $100,000.00.

JUNIOR then sent LIZARAZO MENDOZA the serial number to a dollar bill along with a pass

phrase. The passing of a serial number is common practice used when a contract is given.

LIZARAZO MENDOZA further advised JUNIOR he was going to send $50,000.00, but was

waiting to receive the full amount. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then reached out to CS 1 regarding

CS 1 's availability to pick up this money. CS 1 was instructed to accept this contract, which he

did. This information was passed to HSI Houston for further investigation, but ultimately, this

contract was cancelled.

197. On March 25, 2015, FRENCH MONTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA had

conversation reference to a money contract for $50,000.00 in New York, New York. FRENCH

MONTANA sent LIZARAZO MENDOZA the serial number and pass phrase. No fmiher

information was received in reference to this contract.

Page 85 of 126

198. Also on March 25, 2015, CARRO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a

conversation reference to a money contract for $150,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. CARRO and

LIZARAZO MENDOZA discussed the exchange rate. No further information was received in

reference to this contract.

199. Later on March 25, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and EL PENIX discussed a

money contract in Guatemala for $200,000.00. No further information was received in reference

to this contract.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 16

GISCARD YOHSIA TI PENA PENA

APRIL 13,2015-BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

$126,280.00

200. In April of 2015 LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a contract to pick up

$150,000.00 in Boston, Massachusetts. A phone number and passphrase, "Mauricio de parte de

Luis," was provided to HSI SAC Miami, who, in turn, provided that information to HSI SAC

Boston.

201. On April 13, 2015, an HSI SAC Boston UC made contact with the money courier

who answered the phone by stating, "I am here until4:00 p.m." The courier then gave the UC an

address in the Hyde Park neighborhood of South Boston. Later that afternoon the UC traveled to

the agreed upon location and meet with the courier, subsequently identified as Giscard Y ohsiati

PENA PENA (DOB: 06/25/1977). PENA PENA was observed exiting the right front door of

one of the units located at 298 Wood Avenue. He then approached the UC's vehicle carrying a

white plastic shopping bag. PENA PENA opened the passenger's side door of the UC's vehicle,

placed the plastic bag on the floor and told the UC that it contained approximately $126,000.00.

A final count of the currency showed it to be $126,280.00.

Page 86 of 126

202. After the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions

to CS 1 to have the money wired to the following account:

Global Honest Enterprises Limited

208 Queens Road Central

Hong Kong

Account:

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

203. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia

14

• As will

be discussed below, in May, PENA PENA was atTested in connection with narcotics trafficking

and money laundering activities being investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

204. On April 16, 2015, a conversation between EL FENIX (2BD91A68) and

LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised that he had

$170,000 available to be picked up in Spain. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then sent this same

message to six other of his contacts in an attempt to sell this contract.

205. On April 17, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA and

LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in which CASTRO SANTANA appeared to have

14 The Operation Neymar wiretaps were terminated in May of 2015. At that time, a determination was made to

significantly slow down the enforcement operations undertaken, while preforming investigative follow-ups and

preparing this affidavit and its associated charging documents. Throughout 2015 and until being approached by HSI

and the Panamanian National Police on February 29, 2016 - as described below - LIZARAZO MENDOZA

continued to offer work to CS I on a regular basis in the form of scores of money laundering contracts, however,

those instances are not specifically described herein as they are unnecessary to establish probable cause.

Page 87 of 126

tricked LIZARAZO MENDOZA into going to a meeting at a local bar, where members of La

Oficina were lying in wait, to collect the $200,000 debt they owed. On behalf of CASTRO

SANTANA, an individual known as MAKARIO, a/k/a "The Man in Red," was sent to the

meeting to act as an intermediary and advise CASTRO SANTANA ofthe outcome.

206. The conversation statied out with CASTRO SANTANA telling LIZARAZO

MENDOZA that he was going south and wanted to meet at "the cabin." Approximately fmiy-

five minutes later LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked CASTRO SANTANA if he was their already,

and stated, "Remember, we said 5:00pm." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then said that he was there

"in the cabins." He then asks CASTRO SANTANA, "Where are you?" CASTRO SANTANA

replied, "At the little bar." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then told CASTRO SANTANA that he was

outside of "Addidas." CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA, "I am at the little

bar outside ofValez." When LIZARAZO MENDOZA arrived, he asked CASTRO SANTANA

again, "Where are you?" CASTRO SANTANA then replied, "I'll be right there." LIZARAZO

MENDOZA then told CASTRO SANTANA, "You said you would be here." In response,

CASTRO SANTANA told him that he was in the bathroom. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then

said, "Oh buddy," to which CASTRO SANTANA replied, go ahead and explain to them, "the

man in red" knows the whole thing very well.

207. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then asked CASTRO SANTANA to come over and aid

in his defense. He stated that there were a great number of people present and pleaded to

CASTRO SANTANA, "How can you let me die?" CASTRO SANTANA replied that

LIZARAZO MENDOZA needed to explain everything to the men present at the bar.

208. At 8:01 p.m., LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CASTRO SANTANA that the men

agreed not to kidnap him. CASTRO SANTANA asked what they said, to which LIZARAZO

Page 88 of 126

MENDOZA replied that it was bad and that CASTRO SANTANA should have warned him so

that he could have gotten ready and brought someone to protect him.

209. Afterwards, CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA continued to

speak in reference to who was at fault for the money seized in Miami, Florida, on January 30,

2015. CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA, "you picked the money up, it is

your responsibility." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then responded by telling CASTRO SANTANA

that the police activity was generated in Georgia and was the fault of the organization/money

couriers who dropped the money off with them.

210. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then asked CASTRO SANTANA to speak with EL

CALVO and see how much he would charge to buy him some time to anange for payment.

CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA that EL CALVO would need 20,000, "so

they could give you a break and he will manage everything for you so you don't have to show

face, because they will grab you while we wait for the invoices and documents to see who is at

fault." CASTRO SANTANA advised that the 20,000 was just a break but, "they need to know

when you will be receiving the document and if the documents show that it is your fault, then

you have to pay the whole thing."

211. On April 18, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA and

MAKARIO was intercepted in reference to the previous day's meeting between La Oficina,

MAKARIO, and LIZARAZO MENDOZA. MAKARIO told CASTRO SANTANA that at the

beginning of the meeting La Oficina said that $325,000 was owed. MAKARIO then clarified

that it was $200,000. MAKARIO told CASTRO SANTANA that at the meeting he had told

LIZARAZO MENDOZA that La Oficina had already determined not to collect from CASTRO

SANTANA, but they would not do the same for LIZARAZO MENDOZA and that they needed

Page 89 of 126

their money. CASTRO SANTANA asked, "Dude, what if that guy doesn't want to come out

and what would happen if that man [LIZARAZO MENDOZA] suddenly says that nothing will

be sent?" MAKARIO responded by saying, "No, dude, I'm telling you, and I'm very clear about

this, I'm your friend, but neither you nor him can go out again for anything in the world. Those

men already told me what the whole conversation was about. . . . Although that guy

[LIZARAZO MENDOZA] keeps saying that it's in centro, things got complicated and they were

ready to kill the guy yesterday. It would be better to do our best to resolve this matter

peacefully. I tried to contact Trini yesterday, but that would also involve a lot of expenses and

that's the problem with all these things."

212. Also on April 18, 2015, a conversation between SEAN JOHN and LIZARAZO

MENDOZA was intercepted in which SEAN JOHN was asking for $200,000 in Boston and

wanted to know what rate he could receive for his services. LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded

with a rate of 2110 peso per dollar. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then reached out to CS 1 who was

instructed to accept the contract. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then passed a telephone number and

passcode "617-648-7268" and "German de parte de Victor," respectively, to SEAN JOHN. HSI

Boston was contacted with the information, but, ultimately, this contract did not come to fruition.

213. On April 20, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN

JOHN was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA was solicited SEAN JOHN to pick up

$500,000 in Guatemala, however, it is unknown if this contract was ever completed.

214. On April24, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN

JOHN was intercepted where SEAN JOHN asked LIZARAZO MENDOZA for $100,000 in

New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA agreed to the transaction and SEAN JOHN told him to

pass a phone number. Shmily thereafter LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number

Page 90 of 126

"347-380-9624" and passphrase "Nestor de patie de Arejo." All pertinent information in

reference to this contract was given to HSI New York in an attempt to locate and identify targets,

however, no interdiction could be made.

215. On April 27, 2015, another conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

SEAN JOHN was intercepted in reference to a $200,000 contract in Boston, Massachusetts.

LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed SEAN JOHN the following phone number "617-765-4550" and

passphrase "Alfredo de parte de Pedro." HSI Boston was contacted and all information was

forwarded, but, again, no interdiction could be made.

216. On April 27, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

CASTRO SANTANA was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked if CASTRO

SANTANA had money in New York, Chicago, or Mexico. CASTRO SANTANA replied that

he was "laying low."

217. Later on April 27, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

SEAN PAUL was intercepted where LIZARAZO MENDOZA told SEAN PAUL that there was

$500,000 available in Montreal for pick up and asked SEAN PAUL what his rate was.

Ultimately, this contract was not completed.

218. On May 7, 2015, DEA New England Field Division arrested Giscard Yohsiati

PENA PENA, the money courier who had delivered $126,280 to a HSI SAC Boston UC on April

13, 2016. The DEA's arrest ofPENA PENA was the result of a narcotics trafficking and money

laundering ring being investigated separately from HSI's Operation Neymar. At the time of the

take down, the subjects had $173,000.00 with them. A search of the apmiment at 87 Fayston

Street, Unit #3, in nearby Dorchester, Massachusetts, which the targets had shifted to using as

their base of operations, revealed an additional $35,000.00 and 77.0 grams of cocaine.

Page 91 of 126

219. Subsequent to PENA PENA's arrest on May 7, 2015, HSI SAC Boston was

contacted by the Boston Police Department regarding an individual they had in custody under the

name "Julio Negron." This individual's FBI number showed him to be the same person using

the name Giscard Y ohsiati PENA PEN A. In addition to the charges in the instant case, PENA

PENA had several criminal convictions including a record of narcotics distribution and was

previously depmied from the United States to the Dominican Republic on February 7, 2013.

220. On May 18, 2015, agents from HSI SAC Boston approached the owner ofthe unit

PENA PENA had been observed exiting prior to conducting the money drop on April 13, 2015.

After learning that the apmiment had been "abandoned" by the previous tenant and that it was

currently vacant, consent to search was secured from the owner. A search revealed numerous

items associated with narcotics trafficking and money laundering. In a hallway closet, agents

observed a heavy steel press used for packaging controlled substances. Near the steel press

agents located numerous plastic baggies and a clutch of license plates from both Massachusetts

and Rhode Island.

221. The back bedroom of the apmiment agents located powdered lactic acid, a

common cutting agent used by narcotics traffickers. Nearby, agents discovered a ledger

containing several pages of notes listing names, dates, measurements/amounts, and dollar

figures. In close proximity to the ledger was a plastic baggie containing a densely packed light

brown powdery substance, consistent with heroin. A subsequent field test showed that the

baggie contained 13 .4 3 grams of heroin, with a street value in Boston of over $1,000.00.

222. In a second bedroom agents observed the name "Gismardi Pena" written on the

armrest of a couch in black marker. Additionally, agents observed the work "Yensy," written

nearby. In that same room agents discovered a plastic baggie containing a white powdery

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substance that also appeared to be narcotics. A field test of the substance showed that the baggie

contained 99.6 grams of cocaine, with a value of between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00 on the

streets of Boston depending on packaging and quality. Thereafter, a food-grade heat sealer, and

electronic scale, and several rolls of plastic bags were discovered. Heat sealers, such as the one

in question are common a common tool employed by narcotics traffickers to package drugs and

bulk currency. In addition to their ability to compress the items being sealed, they are desirable

for their perceived ability to lock-in the scent of narcotics or cunency, thus thwmiing law

enforcement's ability to use trained K-9 units to detect their presence in hidden from view. In

the same room, agents located an insurance bill addressed to an individual named "Julio

SANTIAGO NEGRON."

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT ECHO

AMBIORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ

JUNE 2, 2015-NEW ARK, NEW JERSEY

$79,880.00

223. On June 2, 2015, HSI SAC Newark conducted a seizure of $79,880.00, in

Elizabeth, New Jersey. This seizure was the result of surveillance conducted on Ambioris

Antonio ACOSTA de la CRUZ, the money courier identified as conducting the January 6,

February 5, and February 2 7, transactions previously articulated. During the spring of 2015,

ACOSTA de la CRUZ was tracked traveling to a suspected stash house in Hazelton,

Pennsylvania. Subsequently, on June 2, 2015, the resident of that house, Alexis GRUYAIR

SANCHEZ

15

, was surveilled traveling into New Jersey where he met with two other individuals

15 Subsequent to this seizure, in March of 2016, federal agents raided a narcotics stash house in New Jersey

associated with GRUYAIR SANCHEZ. Inside of that location GRUY AIR SANCHEZ's passport was located along

with kilogram quantities of both cocaine and heroin. GRUYAlR SANCHEZ is a convicted felon, on probation, and

cun·ently a fugitive from justice.

Page 93 of 126

in the Garden's Mall parking lot in Elizabeth and received a white bag, containing the currency

in question.

224. After the exchange, traffic stops were conducted on each vehicle engaged in the

transaction. The vehicle which housed the white bag was found to contain $79,880.00 packaged

in quick-count bundles. In addition to the U.S. currency, a digital scale consistent with those

used to weigh narcotics for packaging and sale, was located inside the vehicle. The driver could

not explain the nature of his travels or the presence of the currency, which was thereafter seized.

225. Inside the vehicle that had dropped off the U.S. currency officers located a laptop

bag which, instead of containing a laptop, contained a stack of SIM cards with a note that stated

"change every 11 days." "SIM" stands for "subscriber identity module" or "subscriber

identification module," and is an integrated circuit chip that is intended to securely store the

international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) numbers and their related keys, which are used to

identify and authenticate subscribers on mobile phones. It is also possible to store contacts on

many SIM cards. Because each SIM card is associated with an individual telephone number, for

a number of years criminals have made use of the portability of SIM cards to disguise their

illegal activity by making use of multiple SIM cards and a single phone. The idea being that, if

law enforcement is eavesdropping on your communications or tracking your movements via your

phone's GPS system or cell tower communications, by switching SIM cards within your

electronic device, you effectively go dark until you make use of that particular card again. The

note, "change every 11 days," along with the cache of SIM cards would appear to be instructions

from a supervisor that the user of the SIM cards is to constantly rotate the card in his/her cell

phone or cell phones.

Page 94 of 126

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 17

SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED

JULY 22, 2015- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$49,980.00

226. On July 21, 2015, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information form

CS 1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS 1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of

$50,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. Later on that day, HSI Miami contacted HSI SAC Chicago

Special Agents to assist in this operation. A phone number and passphrase, "Rue da con Chema

de pmie de Hector," was provided by LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

227. Later that day an HSI UC attempted contact with the money courier with negative

results. Shortly thereafter, it was learned that the passphrase had been changed to "Jaime de

pmie de Brian," and that the courier would be initiating the contact with the HSI UC. That

evening, the UC received a call from an unknown individual stating that he was looking for

"Jaime," and that he was calling on behalf of "Brian." The UC then asked how many "tickets"

the caller had and was told that there were "fifty." They agreed to speak the following day to

agree upon a meeting location.

228. On July 22, 2015, the courier and UC spoke again. The courier stated that he

would be ready to meet soon, but that at the moment he was still "reviewing" the "documents."

After agreeing to meet at the Aurora Outlet Mall, outside of Chicago, the courier said he would

be sending a third pmiy to the meet and that he would not be present.

229. After changing meet locations, at approximately 3:15 p.m., a silver Chrysler

minivan occupied by two individuals approached the UC's vehicle, which was parked in a

Walmart parking lot. The passenger of the vehicle then entered the UC vehicle with a pink bag

containing $49,980.00 in quick count bundles, some of which were shrink wrapped. The UC

recognized this individual's voice as being the same as the individual he had been speaking with

Page 95 of 126

on the phone. Upon inspection, a narcotics detecting K-9 unit made a positive ale1i to the

presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

230. Later that evening, the UC received a phone call from an unidentified individual

using a different phone number. The caller asked the UC if he had met with "my guy." He then

clarified that he was referring to a meeting between "Jaime" and "Brian," for "fifty tickets."

After being advised that the transaction had been completed, the caller then stated that he had not

been notified of the exchange by the UC's people. The caller asked the UC to reach out to the

UC's people and request that they contact him to verify the transaction. The UC agreed to do so,

but, ultimately, was unable to reestablish contact with the unidentified caller.

231. As always, CS 1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to wire transfer the

funds, minus the CS's commission. For this transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested the

funds be deposited into the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited

Hong Kong

Account:

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

232. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 18

PEDRO HERNANDEZ

AUGUST 17, 2015 -CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$102,270.00

233. On August 16, 2015, HSI SAC Miami special agents received information from

CS 1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS 1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of

$130,000 in Chicago, Illinois. The passphrase for the transaction was to be "Pancho de parte de

Page 96 of 126

Miguel." Later on that same day, HSI Miami contacted HSI SAC Chicago Special Agents to

assist in this operation.

234. On August 17, 2015, an undercover agent contacted the money courier and the

two agreed to meet later that day at a Lowe's home improvement store in Chicago. The UC had

requested that the unidentified male meet him inside of the Lowe's, but the subject refused due

to the presence of security cameras. The subject then stated that he would leave the currency

inside a silver Nissan Murano parked next to some drywall stacked near the exit of the building.

The UC was instructed that the subject would be standing next to the vehicle to keep an lookout

and for the UC to enter the vehicle and remove a bag containing the currency.

235. Upon locating the vehicle, the UC entered and removed a white shopping bag,

which contained a woman's shoe box packed with $102,270.00 in U.S. currency, separated into

quick-count bundles. A latent fingerprint belonging to an individual named Pedro

HERNANDEZ (DOB: 07/14/1981) was subsequently developed from the shoe box containing

the cunency. Shortly thereafter, an individual later identified as HERNANDEZ, entered the

Nissan Murano which the currency had been left in and drove away. Surveillance units

attempted to follow HERNANDEZ, however, he employed counter-surveillance measures,

forcing the agents to break off their pursuit. Ultimately a photograph of HERNANDEZ was

compared to surveillance stills taken on the date of the exchange and he was positively identified

as the subject of the transaction. HERNANDEZ, is a convicted felon, who has served time in

prison in Illinois, with a history of atTests for violent crime, illegally in the United States from

the Mexican state of Guerrero.

236. After the currency was exchanged, it was transpmied to the Chicago SAC Office,

where a trained narcotics detection K-9 unit ale1ied to the presence of narcotics on the currency.

Page 97 of 126

23 7. After the transaction was confirmed, CS 1 was instructed by LIZARAZO

MENDOZA to wire transfer the funds, minus the CS 's commission, to the following bank

account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited

Hong Kong

Account:

SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

238. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a

business in Miami-Dade County, which then transfened to an account in Miami-Dade County as

payment for products that were expmied to various business associates in Colombia.

239. On August 18, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA was arrested in Cali, Colombia,

pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice, issued at the behest of the United States Attorney's Office

for the Southern District of California, based on their investigation into money laundering in

California on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel. After being arrested he was transferred from Cali, to

La Picota Prison in Bogota, to await an extradition hearing.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT FOXTROT

VICTOR ALBERTO NOGUEDA SOBERANIS

AUGUST 28, 2015- CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

$185,810.00

240. On August 26, 2015, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information from

CS 1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had contacted CS 1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash

pickup of $130,000.00. On August 26, 2015 HSI SAC Miami Special Agents contacted HSI

SAC Chicago to assist in identifying the courier and seizing the U.S. Currency. Upon receiving

the money courier's phone number and the passphrase, "Tomas de parte de Miguel," a HSI UC

called the courier and ananged to meet him in the parking lot of a Home Depot.

Page 98 of 126

241. On August 28, 2015, the couner, subsequently identified as Victor Alberto

NOGUEDA SOBERANIS (DOB: 5/17/92), attempted to meet the UC, but after surveillance

units established NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's presence in the Home Depot parking lot, the UC

placed a call to him to cancel the pick-up for the day in favor of a later date. The UC stated that

the parking lot was "hot," which was a signal to NOGUEDA SOBERANIS that the transaction

should not take place because of a police presence in the area. On the target's travels from the

meet location back to his residence, HSI SAC Chicago Special Agents had oHicers of the

Chicago Police Department conduct a stop of his vehicle for a traffic infraction. Subsequently

NOGUEDA SOBERANIS granted the officers consent to search his vehicle. The consent search

resulted in the discovery of bulk U.S. Cunency in quick-count bundles. The total U.S. Currency

seized from the vehicle was $134,980.00.

242. Following the traffic stop, HSI received penmss10n to search the subject's

residence, which he shared with his parents at 2200 N. Kostner A venue, Apatiment #2, in the

City of Chicago. Prior to conducting the search, agents spoke with NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's

mother, Marinela SOBERANIS LORENZANA who stated that she did not know if there was

any contraband in her home, but that she had recently become aware that her son was involved in

the sale of narcotics. She went on to state that members of their family had been murdered in the

Mexican State of Guerrero due to their involvement in narcotics trafficking and that she feared

for her son.

243. A search of the residence revealed an additional $50,830.00 in quick-count

bundles, in a suitcase which also contained approximately 1 Yt kilograms of cocaine in

NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's bedroom. In addition to the cocaine and cunency, there were three

cell phones, a ledger, and packaging materials found in NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's bedroom.

Page 99 of 126

In the kitchen, on top of the refrigerator, agents located a small digital scale. All of the

aforementioned items were seized and impounded.

244. Subsequent to the search, NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's step-father, Mauricio

Omar HERNANDEZ accompanied agents to the Chicago Police Depmiment to be interviewed.

HERNANDEZ stated that NOGUEDA SOBERANIS had recently become involved in the

distribution of narcotics and was selling cocaine from their house, as well as other locations. A

consent search of HERNANDEZ's cell phone revealed communications consistent with

narcotics distribution. When confronted with this evidence, HERNANDEZ admitted to

engaging in narcotics trafficking in conjunction with NOGUEDA SOBERANIS and that he had

sold ounces of cocaine for roughly $1,100.00 per ounce. When asked about some of the contacts

saved in his phone HERNANDEZ admitted that one of the contacts, "El Borre guion,"· was a

customer for his and NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's cocaine distribution operation. HERNANDEZ

stated that a few weeks prior he had sold El Borreguion three to four ounces of cocaine which

NOGUEDA SOBERANIS had provided him and that NOGUEDA SOBERANIS was giVen

$2,000.00 after the transaction was completed.

245. At this point, HERNANDEZ became apprehensive that his incriminating

statements may subject him to arrest and refused to answer any further questions. He was

subsequently told that he was free to leave.

246. Following NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's arrest, he, too, was transported to the

Chicago Police Depatiment to be interviewed. Prior to interviewing the subject agents

administered the Miranda warnings and NOGUEDA SOBERANIS signed a written rights

waiver form stating his understanding of his rights and willingness to speak with law

enforcement. During the course of the interview NOGUEDA SOBERANIS stated that the

Page 100 of 126

vehicle he had been driving was not his and that he had borrowed it from a friend that he only

knew as "Luis." He indicated that he had only picked up the vehicle that morning and driven it

to a Dunkin Donuts prior to being stopped by the Chicago Police Department. NOGUEDA

SOBERANIS asserted that he did not know there was any cmTency housed in the vehicle and

stated that he assumed the money belonged to the aforementioned "Luis." A records check of

the vehicle in question, a black 2011 Jeep Libe1iy bearing Illinois plate Y818947 revealed that

the vehicle was owned by NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's mother Marinela SOBERANIS

LORN ZAN A and registered to their home address, 2200 Nmih Kostner A venue, Apmiment 2,

Chicago, Illinois, 60639. NOGUEDA SOBERANIS denied any involvement with narcotics

distribution and when confronted with the additional evidence located in his bedroom, he stated

his desire to speak to an attorney, at which point the interview was terminated.

247. On August 31, 2015, the currency seized from NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's

vehicle was inspected by a trained narcotics detecting K-9 unit. The dog gave a positive alert for

the presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

\rrl)e ~ebriefinrx of 3Jban ~lfrebo Qtastro ~antana, Jliorxota, Qtolombia,

~erember 17, 2015

248. From December 14,2015, through December 18,2015, a contingent of state and

federal personnel from Miami, including both AI and A2, traveled to Bogota, Colombia, along

with representatives of the federal government from California, to conduct interviews with target

subjects, including Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, in La Picota Prison. During CASTRO

SANTANA's interview, he had local counsel, Mario Simvaqueua, as well as an attorney from

Miami, Florida, Paola Ramirez, representing his interests. The interview was conducted in

Page 101 of 126

conjunction with a Special Agent Manny Mmiinez from HSI's attache office located in the

United States Embassy in Bogota.

249. During the interview CASTRO SANTANA discussed laundering money via the

Black Market Peso Exchange as well as via hawala, which, he referred to as "contra entrega"

("mirror transaction" in Spanish). He stated that the money that he and his associates laundered

was on behalf of Mexican narco-traffickers. His hawaladar in Mexico is an individual operating

in Mexico City named Jorge CASTANO, whom was identified on our wiretaps as "PELON."

Although CASTRO SANTANA knew ce1iain aspects of the identities of some of the individuals

he was partnered with in Mexico, he denied knowing the specific cmiel or cmiels that they

represented. Intelligence gathered on these individuals, some of whom are under indictment by

the United States Federal Government in California, shows that they are agents of the Sinaloa

Cartel.

250. CASTRO SANTANA acknowledged that amongst other BBM monikers, he had

made use of "PEDRITO," "MIGUEL," and "ANTONIO," while working in conjunction with an

individual known as Ivan LNU aka "ARMANI." Ivan CASTRO SANTANA spoke in some

detail regarding his partnership with Ivan LNU, which he stated eventually came to an end at

some point in 2015 due to their inability to agree on how to resolve a dispute that arose from the

seizure of $200,000 in Miami. He stated that prior to the breakdown in their business

relationship, he and Ivan LNU had partnered in a money laundering enterprise, along with a

varying group of other individuals, during the years 2014 and 2015. He noted that he was the

main point of contact with the narco-traffickers and that Ivan LNU acted as their point of contact

with the individuals who would pick-up the currency in the United States, as well as with the

Latin American businesses that were being used to launder the money.

Page 102 of 126

251. When asked about the individual known as "MAKARIO," alk/a "The Man in

Red," CASTRO SANTANA stated that MAKARIO worked for him as his personal

representative to "La Oficina." CASTRO SANTANA described La Oficina as a professional

organization of kidnappers, specializing in violent means of extorting individuals who owed drug

debts to the cartels that employed their services. MAKARIO was an emissary who would deal

directly with La Oficina and generally keep abreast of the status of collections being undetiaken.

CASTRO SANTANA noted that MAKARIO had acted on his behalf in this capacity during the

course of the collection instituted over the $200,000 seized in Miami.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT GOLF

JOHN BYRON WATSON

FEBRUARY 25, 2016-PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

$73,000

252. In February 2016, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information from

CS 1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had contacted CS 1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash

pickup of $120,000.00 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, HSI SAC Philadelphia was

contacted to attempt to identify the money courier and seize the money, if possible. Upon

receiving the money courier's phone number and the passphrase, a HSI UC called the courier

and arranged for a meeting.

253. On February 25, 2016, HSI SAC Philadelphia agents were able to track the

money courier, subsequently identified as John Byron WATSON, to a home within the

Philadelphia city limits where the bulk currency was being stashed. The courier was seen

leaving this location with a heavily laden plastic shopping bag. Thereupon he entered a white

late model sedan with tinted front and back windows. A roving surveillance was set upon the

vehicle and, ultimately, a traffic stop was conducted. A subsequent a search of WATSON's

Page 103 of 126

vehicle revealed $73,000 in U.S. currency in quick-count bundles, packaged inside of plastic

shopping bags. A subsequent ion scan of the currency showed the presence of cocaine on the

bills. Because the currency in question was seized prior to the contemplated exchange, no

deposit or wiring instructions were ever transmitted from LIZARAZO MENDOZA to CS 1.

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jfebruarp 28, 2016

254. From February 26, 2016, through February 29, 2016, a contingent of members of

the Operation Neymar team from Miami, including A2, traveled to Panama City, in the Republic

of Panama, for the purpose of making an approach on Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been identified entering Panama at Tocumen International Airport

in Panama City, from Cali, Colombia, on February 24, 2016, with his girlfriend, Ana Milena

PENA LORZA (DOB: 11/21/1984). On February 27, 2016, in coordination with HSI's Panama

Attache Office and members of the Panamanian National Police, a trip was taken across the

isthmus, from Panama City to the Port of Colon, on the Caribbean Sea, where LIZARAZO

MENDOZA was staying at the Sheraton Hotel, conducting business in the Free Zone. However,

by the time of HSI's arrival at the Sheraton in Colon, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had already

checked out of the hotel and departed from the Caribbean/ Atlantic side of the country. From

Colon, he had headed back to Panama City, staying at the Double Tree Hotel, before heading to a

beachside town along the coast for one final night. Because it was known that LIZARAZO

MENDOZA was scheduled to leave Panama the following night, it was determined to hold o±I

on approaching him until he checked in at Tocumen International Airport, for his flight back to

Cali.

Page 104 of 126

255. On February 28, 2016, at approximately 7:00p.m., LIZARAZO MENDOZA and

PENA LORZA were observed checking their bags at the Copa Airlines ticket counter at

Tocumen. Thereafter, they proceeded toward the security checkpoint where, in coordination

with several plainclothes members of the vetted unit of the Panamanian National Police, Special

Agent Robert Jimenez of HSI's Panama Attache Office approached LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

After SA Jimenez identified himself and his companions as law enforcement personnel,

LIZARAZO MENDOZA and PENA LORZA stepped away from the security check point and

LIZARAZO MENDOZA agreed to speak in private.

256. At a discrete location within the Copa Airlines terminal at Tocumen, SA Jimenez

and A2 sat down with LIZARAZO MENDOZA to discuss the facts of Operation Neymar. At

the inception of the interview, SA Jimenez and A2 revealed strategic pieces of information

implicating LIZARAZO MENDOZA in international money laundering. Immediately

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's demeanor changed from guarded, yet confident, to extreme

nervousness. In response to the suggestion that he was involved in illegal activity, LIZARAZO

MENDOZA acted paradoxically, first steadfastly denying any wrongdoing and subsequently

making cagey inquiries into whether there were specific names that law enforcement would like

him to provide information against, while at the same time expressing a hesitance to speak freely

due to concerns that the conversation was being recorded.

257. Regardless of his denials, over the course of the interview that followed

LIZARAZO MENDOZA made a series of incriminating statements in response to questions by

A2. When shown pictures of known associates from Colombia and the United States he

uniformly feigned ignorance of their identities. In fact, he was so thoroughly hesitant to

acknowledge any connection to any of his known associates that he only identified his own

Page 105 of 126

sister's photograph after a significant pregnant pause. When shown a photograph of his brother-

in-law, Alejandro LEON VEGA, LIZARAZO MENDOZA stated that he did not know who the

man in the photo was. After denying knowing LEON VEGA, A2 informed LIZARAZO

MENDOZA that the man in the photo was LIZARAZO MENDOZA's brother-in-law, to which

LIZARAZO MENDOZA stated that he was now able to recognize LEON VEGA, and that his

difficulty recognizing him was attributed to the photograph not being a very representative image

of him. When shown a photograph of his long-time business patiner, Ivan Alfredo CASTRO

SANTANA, he again held tightly to the proposition that he had no idea whom was depicted in

the photo.

258. The conversation then turned to the fact that LIZARAZO MENDOZA did not

attend his sister's wedding in Miami during February of2015. He acknowledged that he was not

present at the ceremony, but stated that his absence was not because of fear of U.S. law

enforcement in the aftermath of the $200,000 seizure that took place in Miami two weeks before

the ceremony. Instead, he maladroitly explained that he became suddenly ill and did not make

the trip to the United States due to being sick.

259. At one point, in an attempt at incredulity, LIZARAZO MENDOZA nervously

fired a series of questions at SA Jimenez and A2 demanding to see the physical evidence tying

him to the transactions in question. Specifically, he attempted to challenge the interviewers to

produce video tapes or audio tapes. This was instructive for two reasons:

First, although not unheard of, innocent people do not tend to demand to see proof-

positive oftheir guilt in the form of physical evidence immediately upon being questioned by the

police. Training and experience in this area shows that, typically, a person wrongly accused of

criminal activity of this magnitude remains in a state of semi-shock, astonishment, confusion, or

Page 106 of 126

disbelief until given time away from their accuser to collect their thoughts and analyze the

situation. Common sense dictates that another reason that innocent people do not ask for such

proof is their affirmative knowledge that such evidence does not and could not exist. In this

case, the only emotion LIZARAZO MENDOZA betrayed was his nearly palpable nervousness.

Other than being nervous, he appeared calm, poised, and generally composed throughout the

interview.

Second, his specific demand for the production of audio or video recordings was

narrowly tailored to meet his method of operation and manner of maintaining anonymity - the

exclusive use of electronic communications, which cannot be verified by audio or video

recordings of the transmissions.

260. Towards the end of the interview, LIZARAZO MENDOZA was told that this

would be his only opportunity to improve upon his situation via speaking with law enforcement.

In a moment of what appeared to be resignation, he argued that he was not a "big kingpin."

While this could have been interpreted as a continued denial of the criminal accusations being

leveled against him, in context, it appeared to be LIZARAZO MENDOZA acknowledging his

culpability and engaging in minimization of his role in the enterprise.

261. Shmily thereafter, the interview was terminated and LIZARAZO MENDOZA

repeatedly asked A2 for a copy of his business card so that he could contact him when he got

back to Colombia. A2 instructed LIZARAZO MENDOZA that if he contacted him for the

purpose of meeting again, either with or without an attorney present, the meeting could not take

place in Cali, because of the risk of co-conspirators seeing LIZARAZO MENDOZA interacting

with law enforcement and that such a meeting would have to take place in a neutral location,

such as Panama. Inexplicably, in spite of LIZARAZO MENDOZA's persistent denials of

Page 107 of 126

wrongdoing, he agreed with A2's assessment regarding the location of any future face-to-face

meetings and the need for discretion.

262. The following day, March 1, 2016, despite LIZARAZO MENDOZA's denial of

being the user of BBM1, immediately upon his return to Cali, the active PIN associated with

BBM1 was discontinued and a new PIN was passed along to CS 1. Interestingly, the previous

day, while being interviewed in Panama, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been confronted with the

exclusive use of intemational soccer players as BBM monikers for BBMl. The following day

when he switched PINs, for the first time in the two year history of this investigation, the new

PIN associated with BBM1 was not in the name of a soccer player. The fact that this PIN was

immediately dumped after a significant law enforcement action follows LIZARAZO

MENDOZA's established, reflexive dropping of BBM PINs in the face of law enforcement

activity that he believes could expose him to criminal liability, as evinced by his actions in both

December of2014 and January of2015.

263. From December 2015 through March of 2016 CS 1 was questioned on multiple

occasions regarding the various attempts that had been made to conceal or disguise the identity

of the source of the money laundering contracts in question. At the inception of Operation

Neymar, CS 1 had stated that he did not know the true identity of his source of money laundering

contracts and as the case developed, he maintained that he could not positively identify this

individual. As discussed in this affidavit's section on the methodology employed by BMPE

money brokers and narcotics traffickers, although bosses and supervisors must always know the

identity of their workers, the subordinate workers are often unaware of the identity of the

Page 108 of 126

individual they are working for and are intentionally kept in the dark. For more than a year CS 1

had assumed that Carlos Albetio MOSQUERA VALDES, a Diamante Building money broker

who works in conjunction with the Enterprise, was providing the contracts. More recently, it

become clear to CS 1 that MOSQUERA VALDES and the individual providing the contracts for

Operation Neymar were two different people. In response to this development, effmis at

discerning the true identity of the money broker behind the Operation Neymar contracts was

renewed.

264. During a debriefing ofCS1 in December of2015, A2 showed CS1 a photograph

Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA and asked CS 1 if he knew the man in the picture. CS I

stated that he knew LIZARAZO MENDOZA and was aware that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was

a BMPE money broker operating in Cali, Colombia. CS 1 fmiher stated that he was aware that

LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a sister that lived in the United States and that in February of2015

LIZARAZO MENDOZA had planned to travel to his sister's wedding in Miami, Florida. CS1

went on to state that he knew that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was unable to make the planned trip

because he had a large amount of U.S. currency seized in Miami in the time immediately

preceding his sister's wedding and that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had expressed a concern that if

he traveled to Florida he could get "caught up" in the investigation.

265. Among other factors used to establish LIZARAZO MENDOZA as the source of

the money laundering contracts in Operation Neymar, as previously detailed in this affidavit, on

January 30, 2015, HSI seized approximately $200,000 from LIZARAZO MENDOZA's sister,

Sidia Milady, in Miami. Subsequently, via wire interceptions, it was learned that the source of

the contract that resulted in the seizure spent his own money hiring an attorney in the United

States for Sidia Milady - an act consistent with a close familial relationship. Two weeks after

Page 109 of 126

the date of the seizure, February 14, 2015, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA married her

fiance, Alejandro LEON VEGA, in Miami, which corresponds to the date that Ivan Andres

LIZARAZO MENDOZA was scheduled to be in Miami for his sister's wedding.

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266. In the month of March 2016, at the direction of A2, CS 1 met LIZARAZO

MENDOZA for lunch in the San Sur neighborhood of Cali. The San Sur neighborhood is home

to a secondary currency exchange center and LIZARAZO MENDOZA maintains one of his two

storefronts there. During the meeting, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CS 1 that LIZARAZO

MENDOZA needed to talk to CS1 in private and that CS1 must keep the conversation in

complete confidence. After CS 1 agreed to keep the information to himself, LIZARAZO

MENDOZA explained that while in Panama LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been approached by

U.S. law enforcement and confronted with evidence related to money laundering. Based on

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's behavior, demeanor, and mannerisms, CS1 had the distinct feeling

that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was either recoding their conversation for later use or LIZARAZO

MENDOZA was afraid that the conversation was being recorded. It is known that LIZARAZO

MENDOZA is recording/surveillance conscious because during his interview at Tocumen

International Airport in Panama, he had stated that he was concerned that the interview was

being secretly recorded to be used against him. Regardless, LIZARAZO MENDOZA indicated

that he was extremely fearful that he would be arrested and extradited to the United States and,

although he never explicitly acknowledged being a money launderer, he openly complained to

CS 1 that the "heat" from the wiretaps he had been confronted with had originated in Bogota.

Page 110 of 126

267. LIZARAZO MENDOZA went on to state that he was not a major figure and that

the important people were the owners of the money in Mexico. He subsequently began to

discuss the $200,000 seizure which took place in Miami in January of 2015, stating that the

money in question had been seized directly from someone he described as "a friend of the

family." CS1 then innocently asked LIZARAZO MENDOZA if LIZARAZO MENDOZA was

the broker responsible for the contract that resulted in that seizure, to which he stated, "No,"

while simultaneously giving a coy wink and nod to CS 1. CS 1 understood LIZARAZO

MENDOZA's response to be an acknowledgment that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was in fact the

broker, but that he did not want to audibly acknowledge it.

268. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then sought CSl 's counsel on whether or not

LIZARAZO MENDOZA should contact the federal agent he had met in Panama to "talk." In

this context CS 1 understood the verb "talk," to mean cooperate with law enforcement or

negotiate out a deal. In discussing his options, LIZARAZO MENDOZA expressed grave

concern over the wiretap line sheets that he had been confronted with at the airport in Panama,

but stated that he never talks over the phone, so the government should not be able to prove that

the communications in question belonged to him. The two then discussed how to communicate

in secrecy via BBMs and VOIPs, and the need to frequently change PINs and phone numbers.

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269. Among the facts delineated above, your co-Affiants posit that the following are

indicative of each of the subjects in question being engaged in trade based money laundering:

First, the money couriers and UCs picking up the currency have no preexisting business

or personal relationship and, in fact, do not know each other;

Page 111 of 126

Second, neither the money couners nor the UCs ever claim to be representing any

legitimate business interests;

Third, code phrases or serial numbers were always used to identify the parties involved,

while true identities were never contemplated, offered, requested, or exchanged;

Fourth, code names are used for the cities where the individual transactions are to take

place, in order to obscure the location from law enforcement - such intentional obfuscation

would be a significant detriment to legitimate business while serving no wanantable purpose;

Fifth, traditionally employed business vernacular describing currency was generally not

used in communications between each side's couriers- instead each pmiy would vaguely refer to

the currency in codes. In various Operation Neymar pick-ups, the currency was referred to as

"the problem," "cans of paint," "tickets," "documents," "gallons," "that item," and "the

package";

Sixth, hotel rooms, motel rooms, houses, or apmiments, as opposed to businesses, banks,

accounting firms, or other financial institutions always served as the point of depmiure for the

couriers and currency;

Seventh, cash drops always took place in public locations, such as parking lots, never

inside of businesses or financial institutions where legitimate large-scale monetary transactions

would typically take place. In one especially paradoxical transaction, the exchange of currency

actually took place in the parking lot of a bank;

Eighth, the locations of the exchange were often changed several times for no apparent

reason or due to one side or the other expressing a fear of law enforcement activity in the area;

Page 112 of 126

Ninth, the couriers being employed by the owners of the currency were frequently

convicted felons or illegal aliens two classes of people least likely to be entrusted with

hundreds of thousands of dollars of proceeds belonging to a legitimate business;

Tenth, the money being exchanged was never counted by either party at the time of the

transaction and no alternative attempts were made to ensure the accuracy of the amount being

handed off;

Eleventh, receipts or other forms of verification were never requested from the UCs by

the money couriers as proof of the successful exchange and completion of the transaction;

Twe(fth, the amount of cash being exchanged is hideously large- with contracts ranging

between $50,000 and $1,000,000, typically involving at least six figures of currency. Legitimate

businesses capable of generating such large amounts of revenue almost never accept cash for

their products. Business being conducted on this scale is almost universally conducted via wire-

transfers between vetted accounts belonging to known entities at major financial institutions;

Thirteenth, the amount of currency contracted for and the actual amount of currency that

was ultimately exchanged did not match up on twenty-two of the twenty-three attempted or

completed exchanges endeavored during this operation. There were accounting variances of as

much as approximately $90,000 in a single transaction, at times consisting of couriers providing

too much cunency and at times providing too little cunency. Such discrepancies would not be

tolerated in transactions between legitimate businesses;

Fourteenth, the cunency was always concealed in a fashion irreconcilable with legitimate

business - generally transpmied in shopping bags, shoe boxes, electronics packaging, sometimes

shrink-wrapped, and, one at least one occasion, secreted in a hidden compartment built into the

vehicle being used by the money courier;

Page 113 of 126

F(fteenth, the cunency was never packaged in the manner one would expect in a

legitimate business transaction involving such large amounts of currency, namely crisp,

sequential, bank-banded $100 bills. Instead, the currency in question was always packaged in

quick-count bundles of well-worn, non-sequential bills of multiple varying denominations;

Sixteenth, the money couriers regularly employed counter-surveillance measures in order

to avoid detection by law enforcement. Such measures included refusing to visit locations that

would likely have security cameras on the premises, engaging in "dead drops" where the courier

leaves the currency in a specified location and simply observes the retrieval by his counterpart,

conducting "heat runs," employing various "cleaning" techniques, etc;

Seventeenth, several of the money couriers and associated individuals approached in

connection with this case stated their knowledge or belief that the currency in question was the

proceeds of narcotics sales;

Eighteenth, narcotics and/or narcotics paraphernalia have been discovered in multiple

locations identified as stash-houses for the bulk currency in question. In one notable example, a

kilogram of cocaine was discovered sitting on top of $50,000 in U.S. currency in a stash house in

Chicago, Illinois;

Nineteenth, on every occasion in which a narcotics detection K-9 was used to inspect

bulk currency associated with this operation, the respective K-9 units alerted to the presence of

narcotics on the currency - similarly on at least one occasion an ion scatmer was used to search

cunency and in that instance the device in question gave a positive alert for the presence of

cocaine on the bills;

Page 114 of 126

Twentieth, the money brokers and couriers habitually switched phones and changed

numbers, which is antithetical to legitimate business practices - for example, LIZARAZO

MENDOZA changed his BBM PIN at least five times between May of2014 and May of2015;

Twenty-first, CS 1 informed HSI that LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed him to

exclusively use drop phones to coordinate the bulk-cash pick-ups and to change the phone being

used every few weeks;

Twenty-second, the money brokers and cunency owners exclusively use fictitious names

when communicating via BBM;

Twenty-third, the money brokers continually change the fake names being used every

time they change BBM PINs, showing an effmi to continuously mask their true identities;

Twenty-fourth, on multiple occasions the targeted money brokers have specifically

discussed changing their BBM PINs due to concerns about law enforcement activity;

Twenty-fifth, the targets universally speak in code to refer to the money being moved and

the locations of the money, a practice that would only confuse and inhibit the efficient operation

of legitimate business;

Twenty-sixth, the manner in which these transactions took place, involving third-party

wire transfers of exorbitant sums of money from individuals both unknown and completely

unconnected to any of the recipient's business contacts, is not employed in sector of legitimate

businesses for numerous obvious reasons;

Twenty-seventh, one of LIZARAZO MENDOZA's associates, CRISTO, advised

LIZARAZO MENDOZA to no longer work with a cetiain business because CRISTO believed

the owner of the business was a government informant - a concern clearly outside the realm of

factors taken into consideration by legitimate businesses;

Page 115 of 126

Twenty-eighth, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told one of his associates, ANA MARIA, to

instruct one of his money couriers, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, to hide information

from the attorney he hired for Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA in order to protect the

illegal nature of their business. He also instructed ANA MARIA to find out everything that

Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA had told the Department of Homeland Security;

Twenty-ninth, after the conversation described directly above, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

told ANA MARIA that someone had "ratted on us"; a well-known term used exclusively to

express the concept that a third pmiy notified an authority figure that someone was doing

something illegal, amoral, untoward, or otherwise contrary to policy or normative behavior;

Thirtieth, the owner of the $200,000 seized in Miami on January 30, 2015, referred to

CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA as "rats," in connection with the seizure.

Instead of bringing the issue to the courts for litigation, the owner simply states that if they do

not pay, they will be kidnapped- a modus operandi not employed by legitimate business;

Thirty-first, a series of communications on a phone in the possession of Sidia Milady

LIZARAZO MENDOZA relating to the $200,000 seized in Miami on January 30, 2015, showed

an intent to lie to law enforcement regarding names, telephone numbers, and BBM PINs- such

actions are not only illegal, but obviously incongruent with legitimate business practices;

Thirty-second, the parties to the conversations on the phone found in Sidia Milady

LIZARAZO MENDOZA's possession each expressed fear of going to jail, which is a stress that

legitimate businesspersons need not brook;

Thirty-third, CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA discussed the fact that

law enforcement had possession of the $200,000 which they lost in Miami on January 30, 2015,

but instead of hiring an attorney to file a claim on behalf of a legitimate interest in the currency,

Page 116 of 126

they discussed the fact that the cunency was the proceeds of narcotics sales and who should be

responsible for repayment of the debt;

Thirty-fourth, CASTRO SANTANA subsequently spoke with the emissary to the owner

of the $200,000 seized in Miami, ALFARITO, on March 16, 2015, and the two discussed who

was at fault for the seizure, the fact that the seizure was conducted by law enforcement, and the

notice they had received of the seizure via publication in the newspaper. Subsequently on March

19, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ALFARITO also discussed the formal publication of this

seizure and the time frame in which a claim could be filed. Nevertheless, at no point did they

discuss making a legal claim for the currency and at no point was a claim ever made;

Thirty-fifth, in two conversations between CASTRO SANTANA and SAN BLAS during

March of 2015 the parties expressed concern that someone was "snitching" or "pointing a finger"

at them, and that $600,000 and 8 kilograms of an unspecified narcotic had been seized due to a

phone being tracked by law enforcement - both concerns being antithetical to normative

business practices;

Thirty-sixth, on March 17, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ANTONY discussed their

colleagues turning themselves in and "telling on everybody," which clearly indicates a tacit

acknowledgment of the illegal nature of their business, their fear of law enforcement, and their

associates' ability to expose their criminal activities;

Thirty-seventh, on March 17, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and SAN BLAS discuss a

colleague being threatened with kidnaping for ransom and that individual's great fear of the

kidnappers in question, stating that "he wets his pants," when they talk to him. They then then

discuss the fact that the members of the kidnapping crew have accused them of being "rats";

Page 117 of 126

Thirty-eighth, on March 20, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and MARKARIO discuss not

accepting BBM contact requests from unknown individuals because "there is always a rat

around," stating a concem that is obviously not shared by individuals operating legitimate

business;

Thirty-ninth, on March 24, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA

discussed their belief that the lawyer they hired to represent LIZARAZO-MENDOZA wanted to

withdraw from her representation because he feared it could put his life in danger. It is

axiomatic in the United States that members of the bar are not personally invested in the

individuals they represent, the causes they advocate, or the controversies they litigate. There is

no reason for an attomey practicing law in the United States to fear for his or her life based upon

their professional endeavors unless they believe their clients are engaged in illegal behavior and

willing to resort to extrajudicial processes to solve their disputes

16

;

Fortieth, on April 15, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA received an anonymous phone call

from a representative of the owner ofthe $200,000 seized in Miami, who demanded an in person

meeting, but refused to identify himself. In response, CASTRO SANTANA contacted

ALF ARITO and stated that he was going to bring a "shooter," with him to protect himself;

Forty-first, on April 17, 2015, there was an abmied attempt to kidnap LIZARAZO

MENDOZA at a bar in Cali, Colombia, for his failure to pay out the $200,000 which had been

seized in Miami, Florida, in January - an extraordinary method of bill collecting, especially

considering that the patiies involved were well aware that the currency was in the hands of the

United States Govemment and available to be retumed to anyone with a legitimate claim.

During the incident, LIZARAZO MENDOZA sent CASTRO SANTANA a communication

16 It should be noted that on March 16, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ALF ARITO also discussed that the lawyer

in this matter had been threatened by someone refened to as "EI Negro."

Page 118 of 126

expressing his belief that the kidnappers were going to kill him. On April 18, 2015, CASTRO

SANTANA spoke with MAKARIO regarding the $200,000 debt owned by CASTRO

SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA. During the conversation MAKARIO told CASTRO

SANTANA that due to complications, La Oficina had been ready to kidnap LIZARAZO

MENDOZA during the previous day's encounter;

Forty-second, in debriefing the owner of a business which was used by LIZARAZO

MENDOZA and/or CASTRO SANTANA to launder money on at least a half dozen occasions,

the owner stated the belief that the money in question was the proceeds of narcotics sales and

went on to explained the manner in which the BMPE operates in extensive detail;

Forty-third, while being interviewed in December of 2015, CASTRO SANTANA

acknowledged that both he and LIZARAZO MENDOZA were explicitly aware that the money

being laundered was the proceeds of narcotics trafficking by drug cartels operating in Colombia

and Mexico;

Forty-forth, information provided by both federal and local law enforcement personnel

with decades of experience in the field has corroborated the facts uncovered in this operation,

including the existence of the BMPE, the universal knowledge of those involved that the

cunency in question is the product of narcotics trafficking, and that the exchanges in question are

illegal.

Page 119 of 126

Tblrealtbown of <!Cuarge%

270. Wherefore, Al and A2 request that based on the probable cause articulated above,

an-est warrants are issued for:

271. Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA, for the following fifty-five (55) felony

offenses associated with RICO Predicate Acts 1 through 18:

);> Racketeering

a felony of the first degree;

);> RICO Conspiracy

afelony o.fthefirst degree;

);> Nine (9) Counts of Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

a felony of the first degree;

);> Thirteen ( 13) Counts of Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a .felony of the second degree;

);> Nine (9) Counts of Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

a.felony of the second degree;

);> Four ( 4) Counts of Conspiracy to Launder Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

a.felony of the third degree,· and

);> Eighteen (18) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a.felony of the third degree

272. Pedro CARRASCO, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 1:

);> RICO Conspiracy

afelony ofthefirst degree,·

);> Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a.felony of the second degree;

);> Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

a.felony of the second degree,· and

);> Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a .felony of the third degree

Page 120 of 126

273. Luis Avilar HINESTROZA GONZALEZ, for the following four (4) felony

offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 2:

);- RICO Conspiracy

afelony ofthefirst degree,·

);- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

);- Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

afelony of the first degree; and

);- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

274. Diego PERDOMO, for the following four ( 4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 3:

);- RICO Conspiracy

a felony of the .first degree;

);- Conspiracy to Launder Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the third degree;

);- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony ofthe second degree: and

);- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

275. Jesus VALENCIA, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 5:

);- RICO Conspiracy

a felony of the .first degree:

);- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree,·

);- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree,· and

);- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

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276. Jose Angel CORTEZ RAQUEZ, for the following four (4) felony otienses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 7:

;;.. RICO Conspiracy

a felony of the first degree;

;;.. Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony of the second degree;

;;.. Money Laundering $lOOk or More

a felony ofthefirst degree; and

;;.. Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

277. Alonso RIVERA VALENZUELA, for the following four (4) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 8:

;;.. RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree;

;;.. Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony of the second degree,·

;;.. Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony o.fthe second degree,· and

;;.. Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a felony o.f the third degree

278. Javier CASTRO LEYVA, for the following four ( 4) felony offenses associated

with RICO Predicate Act 9:

;;.. RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the .first degree;

;;.. Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree:

;;.. Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree; and

;;.. Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

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279. Robe11o LOPEZ MORALES, for the following four (4) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 9:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree,·

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

>- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree: and

>- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

280. Duvan BOLANOS MORA, for the following four ( 4) felony offenses associated

with RICO Predicate Act 9:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony ofthefirst degree;

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony ofthe second degree,·

>- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree,· and

>- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

281. Fabio MORENO, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 9:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree;

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony of the second degree,·

>- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree; and

>- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

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282. Edi ACOSTA GAMEZ, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated

with RICO Predicate Act 10:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree;

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

>- Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

afelony of the first degree; and

>- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

283. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, for the following six (6) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 11 and 14:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony ofthefirst degree;

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

>- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

afelony of the first degree; and

>- Two (2) Counts ofUnlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a felony of the third degree

284. Alejandro LEON VEGA, for the following six (6) felony offenses associated

with RICO Predicate Act 11 and 14:

>- RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree;

>- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

>- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

a felony of the first degree; and

>- Two (2) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

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285. Ambioris ACOSTA de Ia CRUZ, for the following s1x (6) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 12 and 15:

);- RICO Conspiracy

a felony of the first degree;

);- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

afelony of the second degree;

);- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

a felony of the first degree; and

);- Two (2) Counts ofUnlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

afelony of the third degree

286. Francisco HARO RODRIGUEZ, for the following four (4) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 13:

);- RICO Conspiracy

a felony of the first degree;

);- Conspiracy to Launder Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the third degree,·

);- Money Laundering Over $20k, Less than $1 OOk

afelony of the second degree,· and

);- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a felony ofthe third degree

287. Giscard Yohsiati PENA PENA, for the following four (4) felony offenses

associated with RICO Predicate Act 16:

);- RICO Conspiracy

afelony of the first degree,·

);- Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony of the second degree,·

);- Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

a felony ofthefirst degree; and

);- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a felony of the third degree

Page 125 of 126

288. Pedro HERNANDEZ, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 18:

~ RICO Conspiracy

a felony o.fthejirst degree;

~ Conspiracy to Launder $1 OOk or More

a felony of the second degree;

~ Money Laundering $1 OOk or More

a felony o.fthe.first degree,· and

~ Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device

a.felony of the third degree

AFFIANT # 1, Jonathan Santana

Detective -Narcotics Bureau

Miami Dade Police Department

AFFIANT #2, Charles Thomas

Special Agent- Financial Crimes

Homeland Security Investigations

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS THE

- - - - - - - - ' 2016.

DAY OF

JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

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